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In 1966, amid hostile concerns and myths, the process of collec-
tive bargaining entered the university system of higher education. A 
dynamic social process grounded in the labor movement dating from the 
industrial revolution, it was intended not as an alternative to the tra-
ditional governance mode of the academy, but rather as a supplemental 
mode to support the advancement of faculty rights (Polishook, 1982). 
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The purpose of this survey was to study select faculty members 
with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions 
of higher education to evaluate whether or not they perceive the process 
of collective bargaining as supportive of faculty members' rights to 
participate in institutional governance. 
The population of the study consisted of 694 faculty members hold-
ing an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized institu-
tions during the spring of 1984. Those faculty members selected for the 
study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during the 
academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for a 
minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track appointment 
in the department. 
The research instrument "A Questionnaire to Study Collective 
Bargaining As a Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of 
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Insti-
tutional Governance" was used to measure for faculty members' perception 
of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in their 
university system in three major areas: (1) Respondent Information, 
(2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Infor-
mation. 
For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining 
would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments 
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in 
institutional governance. The four hypotheses were: 
H:1 The collective bargaining process has affirmed the profes-
sional interests of the academician with an appointment in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education. 
3 
H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year 
institutions of higher education, has provided for the acade-
micians' participation in the planning and policy-making 
process related to the economic interests of the institution. 
H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate 
in determining the institution's educational policy on aca-
demic issues. 
H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the 
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and 
personnel policies of their employment. 
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was used to test 
each of the four hypotheses of the study. Although statistically 
significant differences at the 0.05 level were found within each depen-
dent variable subset of data: (1) professional interests, (2) economic 
interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel poli-
cies, the four hypotheses of the study were rejected. The data, how-
ever, suggest that the respondents at all three of the subject institu-
tions perceive collective bargaining to have provided for (1) a formal-
ized structure and process for institutional decision-making and (2) the 
opportunity to make policy decisions for the two important issues of 
(a) dismissal for cause and (b) grievance procedures. 
4 
These are important results, even though the aggregate data 
suggest that academic collective bargaining in Oregon's 4-year institu-
tions of higher education has not been perceived as having provided 
faculty members with the right to participate in many institutional 
governance issues. 
Dedication 
This dissertation is dedicated to 
my father, Mr. Virgil James Clark, 
and to my niece, Deanna Marie Duyck 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my 
dissertation committee, Dr. rialter G. Ellis, Chairperson, Dr. Gerald K. 
Bogen, Dr. John D. Lind, Dr. David E. Willis and to Dr. Charles A. 
Tracy, the Graduate School Representative to the committee. Throughout 
the process of completing the dissertation, as well as at my oral 
examination and defense, they so generously shared their expertise as 
educators and scholars. 
I will always be particularly grateful to my chairperson, Dr. 
Walter G. Ellis, for the excellent guidance and support that he 
provided me as I worked to reach this important professional goal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION • • • • 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
LIST OF TABLES • • 
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
LIST OF APPENDICES • 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION • • • • 
Purpose and Problems of the Study 
Hypotheses of the Study • • • • • • 
Scope of the Study • • 
Definition of Terms 
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE • 
The University Enterprise • • • • • 
The Contemporary University Setting • • • • • 
Academic Professionalism • • • • • • • 
Academic Governance • • 
A Conceptual Framework for the Traditional Mode of 
Academic Governance • • • 
The Concept of Authority 
The Concept of Power • • • • 
The Concepts of Authority and Power in Academia • 
A Supplemental Governance Mode for the University 
System 
A Definition of Collective Bargaining • • • • • • 
The Purpose of Collective Bargaining in Academia 
A Model for Academic Collective Bargaining •••• 
Patterns of Relationships in Academic Collective 
Bargaining . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Legal Framework for the Establishment of Academic 
Collective Bargaining 
The Federal Sectors 
The Public Sectors 
State Labor Laws 
Collective Bargaining and the University System 
The Entrance of Academic Bargaining into the 
University System • • • • • • • • • • •• 
PAGE 
iii 
iv 
• viii 
xi 
xii 
1 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
10 
10 
11 
12 
15 
16 
16 
18 
19 
19 
22 
22 
24 
25 
25 
29 
29 
31 
31 
vi 
The Scope of Academic Collective Bargaining • • • • 34 
Academic Collective Bargaining Agents/Agreements 35 
The Subject of Contract Negotiations in Academic 
Bargaining .... . . . . . . . . • . . . 39 
Collective Bargaining in the Oregon System of Higher 
Education: Focus on the 4-Year Institutions 44 
The Effects of Academic Collective Bargaining in the 
University System • • • • • • • 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • 
The Research Model: Synthesis of Theory and Fact ••••• 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Demographic Factors •••• 
Contextual Factors 
Institutional Governance 
Professional Interest 
Economic Interest 
Educational Policies • • 
Academic and Personnel Policies 
The Research Methodology • • • 
An Evaluative Survey 
Procedures for the Study 
The Research Instrument 
The Research Population 
The Data Collection 
The Data Analysis 
IV. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Respondent Information • • • • • • • • 
Years of Full-Time Teaching In a 4-Year Institution 
of Higher Education • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Membership in the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors ••••••••••••••••• 
Faculty Members' Involvement in Institutional 
Academic Collective Bargaining ••• • • • 
Age of the Respondent • • • • • • • • • • • • 
University/Departmental Academic Governance Bodies 
Salary •....... . . . . 
Institutional Influences • • • • • 
Introduction • • • • • 
Funding •••••• 
Decision-Making Processes 
Organizational Change 
Students • • • • • • • • • • 
Institutional Governance Information • 
Introduction • • • • • 
Professional Interests 
45 
50 
50 
50 
50 
51 
54 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
59 
61 
61 
64 
65 
68 
69 
69 
70 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
76 
79 
79 
80 
81 
86 
88 
88 
88 
90 
Economic Interests 
Educational Policies 
Academic and Personnel Policies 
Data Analysis Specific to the Four Dependent 
Variable Subsets • • • • • • • • • 
Hypothes is Testing. • • • • • • 
(H: 1) 
(H:2) 
(H:3) 
(H:4) 
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . 
VI. 
Summary of the Study 
Conclusions of the Study • 
Respondent Information 
Institutional Influences 
Hypotheses of the Study •••• 
Professional Interests 
Economic Interests 
Educational Policies 
Academic and Personnel Policies • 
Recommendations • • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
Suggested Further Research • • • • 
Oregon System of Higher Education 
An Expanded Population 
Closing Summary • • • • 
. . . .. 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. .. 
vii 
91 
94 
95 
98 
100 
102 
104 
107 
110 
114 
114 
117 
117 
117 
118 
120 
120 
121 
122 
122 
122 
123 
125 
126 
127 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE PAGE 
I. A Comparison of the Three Basic Contingency Models • •• 18 
of Academic Governance 
II. A Summary of the Major Executive Orders Related to • 28 
Labor-Management Relationship in Federal Unions and 
Agency Management 
III. A Summary of the Characteristics of the Major Laws • •• 32 
Enacted in the Public Sector by 1978 
IV. Growth of Unionization in Higher Education the. • • •• 35 
Public and Private Sector, 1974-1983 
V. Recognized Bargaining Agents January, 1984 • 36 
VI. Academic Agreement, January, 1984 36 
VII. The Major National Organizations As Representatives 38 
of 4-Year Institutions in Collective Bargaining Nego-
tiations 
VIII. Analysis of Bargaining Agents and Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements 
. . . 
. 
39 
IX. The Specific Issues Relative to the Five Major Cate- •• 43 
gories of Academic Contract Negotiations 
X. Distribution of Identified Population for the Re- 65 
search Study in Oregon's Three Unionized 4-Year 
Institutions of Higher Education 
XI. Distribution of Questionnaire Responses Received Ac- 67 
cording to Each Wave By Employing 4-Year Unionized 
Institutions of Higher Education in Oregon 
XII. Distribution of the Profile Characteristic Data 
of the Non-Respondents 
68 
XIII. Distribution of Respondents by Employing Institution 71 
and Years of Full-Time Teaching In a 4-Year Institu-
tion of Higher Education. 
XIV. Distribution of Respondents by Employing Unionized. 72 
Institution and Membership in (AAUP) American Asso-
ciation of University Professors 
ix 
xv. Levels of Involvement in the Colle~tive Bargaining. •• 72 
Process by Institution 
XVI. Institutional Distribution of Respondents by Age • • •• 73 
Range 
XVII. Distribution of Respondents by Academic Rank and Age •• 74 
Range 
XVIII. Distribution of Respondents by University/Depart- 75 
mental Governance Bodies and the Employing Institution 
XIX. Distribution of Respondents by Academic Rank and • • •• 76 
University/Departmental Academic Governance Committees 
xx. Distribution of Faculty Salaries 
XXI. Salary Distribution for Faculty Respondents by • 
Employing Academic Institution 
XXII. Distribution of Salary by Academic Ares for 
Faculty Respondents 
77 
78 
78 
XXIII. Salary Interval Distribution of Faculty Respondents 79 
by Academic Rank 
XXIV. Faculty Members' Perceptions of Institutional 165 
Influences Related to their Decision-Making to Vote 
for a 1983 Contract Renewal 
XXV. Distribution of Respondents' Answers to Questions 82 
8 and 11 of the Research Instrument by the Employing 
Academic Setting 
XXVI. Distribution of Respondents' Answers According to 84 
Questions 14 and 16 of the Research Instrument by 
Employing Academic Institution 
XXVII. Distribution of Faculty Responses to Questions 13 85 
XXVIII. 
and 15 of the Research Instrument by Employing Aca-
demic Institution 
Distribution of Faculty Responses to Questions 
10, 18 and 19 of the Research Instrument by 
Employing Academic Institution 
86 
XXIX. Distribution of Faculty Responses to Questions 7 and 89 
17 of the Research Instrument by Employing Academic 
Institution. 
xxx. 
XXXI. 
Faculty Members' Perception of the Impact of •• 
Academic Collective Bargaining on Their Profes-
sional Interests In Institutional Governance 
Faculty Members' Perceptions of the Impact of 
Academic Collective Bargaining on Institutional 
Structure/Process 
x 
168 
92 
XXXII. Faculty Members' Perceptions of the Impact of 170 
Academic Collective Bargaining on Economic Interests 
in Institutional Governance 
XXXIII. Institutional Respondents' Perception to Selected 93 
(29, 30, 31 or 34) Statements Related to Economic 
Interest in Academic Governance 
XXXIV. Faculty Members' Perceptions of the Impact of Aca- 96 
xxxv. 
XXXVI. 
XXXVII. 
XXXVIII. 
demic Collective Bargaining on Educational Policy 
Determinants in Institutional Governance 
Faculty Respondents' Perception of the Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on Academic and Personnel 
Policies of Institutional Governance 
Population Values for the Sum Scores . . . . . 
Characteristics For the Dependent Variable Sub-Sets 
According to Sum Score 
Kruskal-Wallis Statistic P-values for the . . . . 
Variables 
97 
. 99 
100 
. . . 101 
XXXIX. Simultaneous Comparisons of Sub-Group Means for 102 
Faculty Respondents' Perceptions of Academic Col-
lective Bargaining and Professional Interest Issues. 
XL. Simultaneous Comparisons of Sub-Group Means for 105 
Faculty Respondents' Perception of Academic Col-
lective Bargaining and Economic Interest Issues 
XLI. Simultaneous Comparisons of Sub-Group Means for •••• 108 
Faculty Respondents' Perception of Academic Col-
lective Bargaining and Educational Interest Issues 
XLII. Simultaneous Comparisons of Sub-Group Means for •••• III 
Faculty Respondents' Perception of Academic Col-
lective Bargaining and Academic/Personnel Interest 
Issues 
FIGURE 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
LIST OF FIGURES 
The General Labor-Relations Model 
The General Patterns of Labor-Management Relationships 
The Research Model • • 
The Dependent Variable Set of the Research Model • 
xi 
PAGE 
23 
24 
52 
55 
APPENDIX 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
The Research Instrument 
Findings Specific to the 1969 Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education Survey 
Human Subjects Research Review Committee Approval 
Letter 
Data Collection Information Letter from the Office 
of Institutional Research Office at Portland State 
University 
Institutional Approval Letter for Data Collection 
Appeal Letter to Subjects for Wave One of the Data 
Collection 
Follow-Up Appeal Material to Subjects for Waves 
Two and Three of the Data Collection 
X Respondent Codebook for the (SPSS ) Data • • • • 
Analysis 
Table XXIV: Faculty Members' Perceptions of 
Institutional Influences Related to the Decision-
Making to Vote for a 1983 Contract Renewal 
Table XXX: Faculty Members' Perceptions of the 
Impact of Academic Collective Bargaining on Their 
Professional Interests In Institutional Governance 
Table XXXII: Faculty Members' Perceptions of the 
Impact of Academic Collective Bargaining on Economic 
Interests in Institutional Governance 
xii 
PAGE 
140 
147 
149 
151 
153 
156 
158 
161 
166 
169 
171 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary American university system emerged in the 1960s 
as a powerful societal force, with economic and political influence, 
as well as a substantive concentration of resources and multipurpose 
capacity (Sherman & Loeffler, 1971; McHugh, 1973). As an enterprise, 
the university system was described by Clark Kerr in 1963 as: 
A major producer, wholesaler and retailer in the knowledge 
industry, which was inextricably related to national growth 
and the w~ll-being of society, as well as a major instrument 
of societal purpose (Kerr, 1963). 
During the "era of growth" in the university system of higher 
education, the role of university teacher was professionalized. This 
status provided the academician with the professional autonomy 
required to participate in academic governance through (1) the setting 
of performance standards, (2) the regulation of terms and conditions 
of employment, and (3) the setting and regulation of academic 
standards and procedures for undergraduate and graduate education 
(Shulman, 1979). Furthermore, the academician's right to shared 
authority, as the traditional mode of academic governance, was 
developed and sustained in higher education, according to J. Victor 
Baldridge because: 
(a) Faculty had the direct flow of its members into 
administrative positions; 
(b) Departmental members developed educational programs for 
students and faculty, hired faculty, and set the standards 
of performance. 
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(c) Academic senates were formed to provide for influence/advice 
to the administration in institution-wide matters 
(Baldridge, 1982). 
While the administration and faculty members were firmly 
committed to the concept of shared authority in the higher education 
enterprise, it was a brief golden age for the traditional mode of 
academic governance (Garbarino, 1973, 1975). 
The mid-1960s brought a combination of contextual factors, both 
external and internal to the university system, which affected the 
governance structures and function of the academy (Garbarino, 1973). 
Among these factors were three major events: (1) the increase in 
campus size and in the number of colleges and universities, 
(2) increased financial problems, and (3) federal regulation that 
reduced the faculty members' influence in academic governance through 
departmental or campus-wide structures (Shulman, 1979). 
By 1966, as a consequence of these events, academic collective 
bargaining emerged as a supplemental governance mode for the academy. 
It was a mode of governance that was not intended as an alternative to 
the traditional governance forms of the university system but rather 
as a supplemental mode that would guarantee the advancement of faculty 
governance rights (Polishook, 1982). 
A dynamic social process, grounded in a labor movement dating 
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from the industrial revolution, collective bargaining has made 
enormous gains in higher education (Nelson, 1982). During the past 17 
years, amid initial hostile concerns and myths, the process has 
increased in public and private 4-year institutions of higher 
education. As Irwin H. Polishook (1982) stated: "The proportion of 
academic professionals who have voluntarily joined unions is greater 
than the proportion of other Americans who have joined unions 
(Polishook, 1982; Nelson, 1982). 
In the university system, the growth of academic collective 
bargaining has been assured because of a well-defined legal 
environment, with established laws as the basis for f~deral and state 
sector employee negotiation (Hedgepeth, 1974). Although federal sector 
bargaining laws are an important part of the legal framework, the 
enactment of state regulative laws, which include comprehensive and 
permissive legislation, is of particular significance to education, 
according to Joseph W. Garbarino: 
Education is a function basically of the states. While the 
degree of encouragement among states varies greatly, 
permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the 
burst of academic unions of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Garbarino, 1973). 
By 1973, Oregon was among the original eight states to have 
enacted significant comprehensive bargaining laws for the educator as 
a public employee. These laws permitted faculty members with an 
appointment in an Oregon 4-year institution of higher education to 
select collective bargaining as a supplemental mode for their 
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participation in institutional governance (Garbarino, 1973). 
That choice has been confirmed by educational analysts such as 
Aussieker and Garbarino, Baldridge and Lee as the mode of governance 
adopted by academicians to improve or reinstate independence into 
their professional lives (Shulman, 1979). Furthermore, the recent 
scholarly works of Lee, Polishook and Kemerer/Baldridge have continued 
to support the position that faculty members have gained or maintained 
a substantive role in academic governance as a result of institutional 
unionization (Lee, 1979; Polishook, 1982; Baldridge, 1982). As 
Barbara A. Lee wrote in 1979: 
Faculty as a whole gained formal governance powers through 
the union contract. Even on campuses where faculty have 
enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract 
legitimized and in many cases broadened the scope of faculty's 
governance rights (Lee, 1979). 
In 1982, J. Victor Baldridge identified four positive trends in 
the formal governance rights of faculty members in university systems 
with academic collective bargaining. These trends, which support the 
formal governance powers gained by unionized faculty, are: 
(1) The collective bargaining process standardized procedures in 
personnel practices for the academicians, with the benefits to 
them identified as: (a) order to the system, and (b) increased 
equity. 
(2) The collective bargaining process helped the economic status 
of the profession. The bargaining process seems to have generated 
additional money. 
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(3) The collective bargaining process resulted in the so-called 
"dual track" relationship between faculty senates and unions, 
whereby senates serve faculty members' academic interests and 
unions serve their economic concerns, remaining viable at campuses 
that have both unions and senates. 
(4) The collective bargaining process may be an incentive to the 
"decentralization" of administrative powers and authority 
(Baldridge, 1982). 
Therefore, the research question arises: Has the adoption of 
collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher educa~ion supported the rights 
of faculty members for participation in institutional governance? 
Purposes and Problems of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the faculty members 
with academic appointments in Oregon's 4~year unionized institutions 
of higher education to evaluate whether or not collective bargaining 
supports faculty members' rights to participate in institutional 
governance. To achieve the stated purpose, the following problems 
were investigated: 
1. Have the professional interests of those academicians with an 
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education been affirmed through the collective bargaining 
process? 
2. Has collective bargaining provided for the academicians' 
participation in financial planning and policy-making related 
to their economic interests as employees of an Oregon 4-year 
institution of higher education? 
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3. Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate 
in determining those institutional educational policies 
related to academic issues? 
4. Has the collective bargaining process provided the faculty 
members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education 
with the opportunity to participate in determining the 
academic and personnel policies of their employment? 
Hypotheses of the Study 
For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining 
would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments 
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in 
institutional governance. 
H:l The collective bargaining process is perceived as affirming 
the professional interests of the academician with an 
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education. 
H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year 
institutions of higher education, has provided for the 
academicians' participation in the planning and 
policy-making process related to the economic interests of 
the institution. 
H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education 
participate in determining the institution's educational 
policy on academ~c issues. 
H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty ~embers in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the 
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and 
personnel policies of their employment. 
Scope of the Study 
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The population of the study consisted of selected academicians 
holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized 
institutions in the spring of 1984. Those faculty members selected 
for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment 
during the 1983~84 academic year, (2) have been employed in the 
present institu~ion for a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on 
a tenure track appointment in the department. 
The questionnaires for this study were sent to 694 faculty 
members with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions 
during the spring of 1984. 
Data for the study were collected from the population of the 
study between May 21, 1984, and August 10, 1984. The research 
instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As A 
Process Adopted in Oregon's 4~Year Institutions of Higher Education to 
Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional 
Governance," was used for the data collection (See Appendix A). 
Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions of the 
major terms have been used: 
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1. Collective Bargaining -- Means the performance of the mutual 
obligation of a public employer and the representative of its 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to employment relations, or the negotiation of an agreement, 
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either 
party. However, this obligation does not compel either party to agree 
to a proposal or require the making of a concession (Oregon, 1982). 
2. Institutional Governance -- The formal structure and related 
activities that are used to make decisions affecting organizational 
relationships, procedures and policies (Duryea, Fisk, et al., 1973). 
3. Academician -- An educator who holds an academic appointment 
in a 4-year institution of higher education. 
4. Academy -- A 4-year university/college of higher education. 
5. Contextual Factors -- These are a combination of issues, both 
external and internal to a university system of higher education, that 
affect the institutional governance structure and function (Garbarino, 
1973). 
6. Professional Interests -- A stature, gained during the 1960s, 
which provides the academician with the right to pursue the three 
central elements of the traditional academic model: (1) research, 
(2) peer evaluation, and (3) scholarship, as well as the right to 
autonomy in setting professional standards and regulating thp. terms 
and conditions of employment (Shulman, 1979). (See questionnaire 
items: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, ?6, 27). 
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7. Economic Interests -- In a university system, faculty members 
are expected to participate, either directly or indirectly through 
structures of self-government within the institution, in the 
determination of policies and procedures related to economic issues. 
There are three types of such issues, those related to: (1) the total 
resources available to the institution, (2) the distribution of 
resources allocated to provide for the academician's economic security 
(e.g. salary, fringe benefits), and (3) the allocation of resources to 
major budgetary categories. (Brown, 1969; Wollett, 1971) (See 
questionnaire items: 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36). 
8. Educational Policies Are the written policies within a 
university system that govern the implementation of such academic 
issues as curriculum, degree requirements, or professional teaching. 
(See questionnaire items: 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43). 
9. Academic and Personnel Policies -- Are provisions in the 
academicians' employment agreement related to a wide spectrum of 
bargaining subjects in the university system, which include such 
issues as academic duties, standards, personnel policies, and support 
services. (Wollett, 1971) (See questionnaire items: 44, 45, 46, 47, 
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56). 
Chapter II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The University Enterprise 
The Contemporary University Setting 
The late 1950s and virtually all of the 1960s have been described 
as the "golden years" of prosperity for American higher education 
(Garbarino, 1973). It was an "era of growth," which Joseph W. 
Garbarino in 1973 described as the direct result of a combination of 
factors external and internal to the system of higher education. The 
factors included: 
An increase in the college-age population, the continued 
growth in the proportion of the relevant age group attending 
college, the international scientific and technological 
competition touched off by the successful Soviet satellite 
launching in 1958, and the competition among states to provide 
university centers to facilitate the growth of science-based 
industry combined to expend university budgets and - because 
of relative shortage of experienced faculty - to expand 
salaries and prerequisites (Garbarino, 1973). 
As a consequence of phenomenal growth, by the 1960s, the 
university system emerged with societal influence, as well as economic 
and political importance (Sherman and Loeffler, 1971). In 1963, W. 
Clark Kerr, in an address at Harvard University, stated: 
We are just now perceiving that the University's invisible 
product, knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in 
our culture, affecting the rise and fall of professionals and 
even social classes, of regions and even nations (Sherman and 
Loeffler, 1971). 
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Therefore, the contemporary American system is best described as 
a corporate institution or social system (McHugh, 1971; Lipset, 
1975). It is a system that has developed into a diverse and complex 
structure, with no single organizational form (McHugh, 1971). For 
while some private and public institutions have all their faculty 
members and staff located on one campus, others are widely separated 
geographically (McHugh, 1971). 
Furthermore, the university system is composed of highly 
disparate elements (Lipset, 1975). Although most 4-year institutions 
of higher education have adopted research on the basic value of the 
academy, its traditional characteristic functions -- research, 
teaching, and public service are combined to provide for the 
acquisition, transmission, and application of knowledge in various 
degrees and for various programs (Lipset, 1975; McHugh, 1971). 
Academic Professionalism 
In order for the American system of higher education to meet the 
expected societal performances as an institution, diverse 
professionals are appointed to teaching positions within the academy. 
These appointments bring together the lives and works of the best in 
each field to form a "colIUllunity of scholars," (t-1cHugh, 1971) a 
community that through the years has established traditions for the 
academy--traditions that have formed the academic model of higher 
education based upon the value and practice of academia. 
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The academic model of professionalized university teaching 
embodies three central elements: (1) Research is an important 
endeavor and the force of the university life, (2) academic work 
requires peer judgment, and (3) scholarship is a vocation in its own 
right (Shulman, 1979). The model brought a status that, according to 
Carol H. Shulman (1979), provides the academician with a new stature. 
Professional prestige grew as scholars assumed more influence 
over areas for which they claimed expertise: (1) the academic 
standards and procedures for undergraduate and graduate 
education, and (2) terms and conditions for faculty 
employment. These gains furthered their concept of 
professionalism by allowing: (1) autonomy in setting 
standards of performance, and (2) in requesting the terms and 
conditions of employment (Shulman, 1979). 
Academic Governance 
The culture of the academy by the 1960s further reflected the 
professionalism of higher education, with the academician role within 
the university community defined as both a participant and employer. 
This culture set the standards to which all academicians in general 
may aspire, that a faculty, in a broad sense of the word, function as 
a responsible corporate body (Duryea and Fisk, 1973; McHugh, 1971). 
As James B. Conant, the former president of Harvard University, said: 
This tradition, also developed in the medieval university, 
prevails in a large measure in the university of today. For 
in an institution which is a university, in fact as well as 
name, the teachers are members of a body with vast powers and 
commensurate responsibilities •••• The autonomy of the 
institute rests fundamentally on the autonomy of each faculty, 
which embodies in its spirit and action the university 
tradition (McHugh, 1971). 
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Therefore, the concept of shared authority became the guiding 
principle for the development of the academic profession (Duryea and 
Fisk, 1973). It was a trend that, according to Robert E. Fisk and E. 
D. Duryea: 
Stamped the services of the professionals, making them 
inherently more than employees and strengthened the ancient 
ideal of the university as primarily an association of 
academicians (Duryea and Fisk, 1973). 
In 1966, these principles were concisely articulated for the 
academy in the "Statement on Governments of Colleges and 
Universities," which was jointly formulated by the American 
Association of University Professors, the American Council on 
Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and 
Colleges (Haslam, 1974). This Statement called for a mutual 
understanding regarding the governance of the academic institutions, 
stressing shared responsibility and the proper interrelation among the 
constituencies of administration, faculty, and, to some extent, 
students (Brown, 1969; Haslam, 1974). The appropriate scope of the 
academician's participation in the academic governance of an 
institution was defined in the statement as follows: 
(a) The faculty has primary responsibility for such 
fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter, and methods 
of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of 
student life that relate to the educational process. 
(b) The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees 
offered in courses, determines when the requirements have been 
met, and authorizes the president and board to grant the 
degrees thus achieved. 
(c) Faculty status and related matters are primarily a 
faculty responsibility; this area includes appointments, 
re-appointments, decisions not to re-appoint, promotions, the 
granting of tenure, and dismissal. 
(d) The faculty should actively participate in the 
determination of policies and procedures governing salary 
increases. 
(e) The chairman or head of the department, who serves as 
the chief representative of his department within an 
institution, should be selected either by departmental 
election or by appointment following consultation with members 
of the department and of related departments; appointments 
should normally be in conformity with the department members' 
judgment (Sands, 1971). 
14 
15 
Furthermore, the statement stressed that the principle of shared 
governance is important to the academy in contemporary times for three 
major reasons: 
(1) The academic institution, public or private, has become 
less autonomous; buildings, research, and student tuition are 
supported by funds over which the college or university 
exercises a diminishing control. Legislative and executive 
governmental authority, at all levels, plays a part in the 
making of important decisions in academic policy. If these 
voices and forces are to be successfully heard and integrated, 
the academic institution must be in a position to meet them 
with its own generally unified view, (2) Regard for the 
welfare of the institution remains important despite the 
mobility and interchange of scholars, and (3) A college or 
university in which all the components are aware of the 
interdependence, of the usefulness of communication among 
themselves, and of the force of joint action will enjoy 
increased capacity to solve educational problems (AAUP, 
1984). 
A Conceptive Framework for the 
Traditional Mode of Academic Governances 
The conceptive framework upon which the principles of the 
traditional modes for academic governances have been developed include 
these concepts: (1) authority, and (2) power. While these concepts 
are often confused, they can be clearly differentiated. 
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The Concept of Authority 
Authority is a formal concept and issues from a formal 
organization (Hicks, 1967). It is always a property of social 
organization with the exercise of authority never extending beyond the 
limits of the association in which it is institutionalized and which 
gives it support and sanction (Flippo, 1970). Furthermore, from the 
use of a basic definition of authority, as a right to act or direct 
the action of others, two explicit characteristics of authority are 
stated: (1) authority is a right and (2) as a result of possessing 
the right, one is entitled and obligated to directly or indirectly 
act. Also implied but not explicitly stated in the definition is a 
third characteristic of authority, which involves the power to employ 
penalties or sanctions so that desired action is completed (Bierstedt, 
1964) • 
The Concept of Power 
Power is a broad concept that is not necessarily confined to an 
organizational contract and that is neither completely formal nor 
informal in nature, though it may be influenced by subjective factors 
including ethical and moral considerations (Sisk, 1979; French, 
1974). 
According to Max Weber: "Power is the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1947). Gerald R. Salancik and 
Jeffrey Pfeffer define power as: "The ability to get things done the 
way one wants them to be done." (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). In 
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other words, power is the ability of a person to do something measured 
in terms of his/her ability to (1) give reward, (2) promise rewards, 
(3) threaten to withdraw current rewards, (4) withdraw current 
rewards, (5) threaten punishment, and (6) punish (Hicks, 1967). 
Power, an emotionally laden term, particularly in organizational 
cultures that emphasize individuality and equality, is essentially a 
relationship between people operating as individuals or groups. It 
does not consist of brute force, coercion, and dominance, but it can 
be a highly effective instrument in an organization (Flippo, 1970). 
Although Warren Bennis has stated, "While power is the organization's 
last dirty secret," power is far from being a dirty business. In its 
most noted form, power is one of the few mechanisms available for 
aligning an organization with its own reality. Consequently, power 
can be viewed, not as a dirty secret, but as a secret .to success 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). 
To demonstrate power as a positive force in an organization 
Salancik and Pfeffer advance a strategic-contingency model of power 
theory. This model views power as: 
Something that accrues to organizational subunits that cope 
with critical organizational problems. Power is used by all 
who have it to: (1) enhance their own survival through 
control of scarce critical resources, (2) through the 
placement of allies, i.e., key positions, and (3) through the 
definition of organizational problems and policies (Salancik 
and Pfeffer, 1977). 
Therefore, by the use of the processes to develop and utilize 
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power by individuals or groups in an organization, the system becomes 
more aligned or misaligned with its environment (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977) • 
The Concepts of Authority and Power in Academia 
In academia, the concepts of authority and power, as implemented 
within the university system, are best described by three basic 
contingency models of governance, the (1) collegial, (2) bureaucratic 
and political. 
As shown in Table I, the three models are different in their 
appearance/process related to governance in the university system in 
the arena of: (1) image, (2) change, (3) conflict, (4) view of social 
structure, (5) theoretical foundation, (6) decision-making, and 
Baaic linage 
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TABLE I 
A Comparison of che Three Basic 
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Governance (Baldridge, 1971) 
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(7) goal setting and policy formulation/execution. 
A Supplemental Academic Governance 
Mode For the University System 
For the past two decades, collective bargaining has become a 
supplemental mode for academic governance in higher education. A 
complicated force, grounded in a labor movement that dates from the 
industrial revolution and the twentieth-century organization of 
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workers, ~he process of academic collective bargaining has, according 
to E. D. Duryea and Robert S. Fisk (1973): 
Posed a significant change in the academic milieu. By 1970, 
professionals in an expanded number of institutions had 
accepted bargaining agents, usually affiliated or associated 
with a national organization, to represent their interests. 
In effect, these individuals turned away from a primary 
dependency on shared governance to a more pragmatic reliance 
upon the power of organizations outside the disciplinary and 
professional societies (Duryea and Fisk, 1973). 
The process was declared by Irwin H. Polishook (1982) as: "The 
practice of the decade in higher education, which has grown in greater 
proportions than the proportion of other Americans who have joined 
unions" (Polishook, 1982). 
A Definition of Collective Bargaining 
The process of collective bargaining, using the basic industrial 
definition, as written by Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg, 
(1979), may be defined as: 
A joint determination of the terms and conditions of the 
employment relationship by duly chosen employer and employee 
representatives. The process involves offers and counter-
offers, with the ultimate objective of reaching a written 
contract (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). 
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Furthermore, the process of academic collective bargaining, which 
initially was introduced into the university system in 1966 at the 
United States Merchant Marine Academy, (Garbarino, 1975) has been 
defined by the following scholars: 
(a) William F. McHugh (1971)--Collective bargaining is a 
process, adversary in nature, which is designed to resolve 
conflict arising in an employment relationship. The process 
consists of two fundamental elements: the act of negotiation 
and the more informal relationship created during the 
implementation of the contract after it is negotiated and 
accepted by the parties, i.e., faculty relations under the 
contract. This bilateral relationship between faculty and 
administration characteristically involves problem-oriented 
consultation between the parties and administration of the 
contract's grievance system for the purpose of reaching mutual 
accord. When mutual accord is not achieved, resort may be had 
to more formal procedures for conflict resolution, such as 
mediation, fact-finding and arbitration. Thus, collective 
bargaining, as the term is used here, means not only the 
actual collective negotiation sessions but also the 
complicated and subtle university-professional relationships 
that develop as the parties live under the contract (McHugh, 
1971) • 
(b) Donald H. Wo11ett (1971)--Co11ective negotiation in the 
context of higher education, like its counterpart in the 
private sector, is essentially a process of proposal and 
counter-proposal, of action and reaction, of give and 
take--resu1ting finally in "deal" or "no deal," in agreement 
or stalemate. The process assumes parity of legal standing 
between the parties and some bargaining power on both sides. 
Bilateral determination of the terms and conditions of 
employment through the process of collective negotiations 
means that neither party should have the ability to impose its 
will on the other and that each is able to veto the proposals 
of the other (Wo1lett, 1971). 
(c) C. Donald Sands (1971)--Collective bargaining can 
reasonably be viewed as one among alternative procedures for 
achieving faculty participation in decisions affecting policy 
at academic institutions. The bargaining process is 
consistent with historic traditions of relative autonomy for 
institutions as well as individuals concerning matters of 
intellect and pays deference to the pragmatic consideration 
that absent such freedom and independence the academic 
enterprise cannot effectively serve its historic mission 
(Sands, 1971). 
Cd) C. L. Haslam (1974)--Col1ective bargaining is a process, 
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one which lends itself to a variety of expressions. It may 
indeed lead to an adversary relationship, but it may also 
result in a kind of enforceable shared authority by virtue of 
a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. The broad 
parameters that influence the ultimate impact that collective 
bargaining has upon institutional relations depend upon the 
nature of the institution itself, the quality of the issues of 
local concern, and, above all, the character of the collective 
bargaining agent (Haslam, 1974). 
The Purpose of Collective Bargaining in Academia 
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The purpose of implementing the process of collective bargaining 
into the university system as an alternative mode for academic 
governance, according to Donald H. Wollett, (1971) is twofold: 
First, faculty must have the right without legal or other 
restraints to form and join organizations of their own 
choosing, to designate their organization and their 
representatives for the purposes of dealing with their 
employing institutions, and to participate in related 
organizational activity. Second, both the faculty 
organization and the governing board must have the capacity to 
engage in a process of give and take negotiations (Wollett, 
1971). 
A Model for Academic Collective Bargaining 
The general labor relations model, as seen in Figure 1, has been 
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adapted to the university system in order to manage activities related 
to academic collective bargaining. 
The model has three major elements: (1) the structure of 
selecting the bargaining representatives, (2) the structure of 
negotiating the contract, and (3) the structure of administering the 
contract to emphasize decision-making by consensus, rather than to 
have unilateral decisions imposed upon a faculty by administration 
(Wollett, 1971). Furthermore, these elements, according to Marvin J. 
Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg (1979), "have a basic logic and a 
sequence that is controlled, in part, by established procedure and 
modified by the behavior of all the participants" (Wollett, 1971). 
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Procedures 
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Figure 1. (Levine and Hagburg, 1979) The general labor 
relations model. 
Patterns of Relationships in Academic 
Collective Bargaining 
The use of the general labor relations model to implement the 
process of collective bargaining into the university system is best 
achieved through the application of the general pattern of 
labor-management relationships as illustrated in Figure 2. 
To .. orll; looether lor 
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I 
Struc1ute" to 1IIor .. 
tooaCher lor common 
;:Jureo •• 
Figure 2. (Levine and Hagburg, 1979) The general pattern of 
labor-management relationships. 
Of the identified patterns of possible ways to manage 
relationships in the academic milieu, two patterns, cooperation and 
collaboration, are best-suited to prevent or manage conflict in 
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academic governances. First, cooperation is the pattern characterized 
as working together under law to achieve a common purpose (i.e., the 
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labor contract). Second, collaboration is that pattern in which the 
faculty members and administration consider institutional conflict 
dysfunctional; therefore, they make a commitment to work together, in 
order to prevent confrontation in bargaining, to achieve an effective 
organization system in the university system (Levine and Hagburg, 
1979) • 
The Legal Framework For the Establishment 
of Academic Collective Bargaining 
The Federal Sector 
Until 1962, federal employees were permitted but a limited right 
to engage in collective bargaining activities, in part because of the 
sovereignty doctrine (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). That doctrine held: 
The employment relationship in government, like that in the 
private sector, appears more authoritarian at first than it 
really is. Government's apparently unlimited authority over 
its employees was originally based on its sovereignty. The 
idea that government employees have only the rights that the 
government permits them is related to the concepts that the 
king can do no wrong and that government can be sued only with 
its consent. The sovereignty doctrine has often been 
used • • • • to uphold a denial of the right of employee 
organizations to negotiate the terms of employment (Stanley, 
1972). 
Furthermore, prior to the enactment of executive order 10988 
there was no government-wide system of rights and representatives for 
collective bargaining between federal unions and the employer 
(Stanley, 1972). As Chairman John W. Macy Jr. of the Civil Service 
Commission stated in 1962: 
The weakest single element in the personnel programs of the 
'40s and the '50s, in my opinion, was the lack of a realistic 
and reasonably uniform system of employee-management relations 
(Macy, 1962). 
26 
By 1961, the federal labor organizations were representing an 
estimated 760,000 workers on a broad internal scope. These 
organizations were restricted to the internal utilization of 
congressional lobbying to improve wages and the working conditions for 
the federal employees (Macy, 1962). However, these legislative 
efforts were, according to Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg, 
"rejected by the executive branch as unnecessary and unduly 
restraintive of the administrative flexibility required by agency 
heads" (Macy, 1962). 
During the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy, the 
efforts of those involved in the federal sector labor-management 
relations began to identify a possible change in executive attitude 
toward the development of collective bargaining on a system of 
industrial governments when Kennedy stated that: "He had always 
believed in the right of federal employees to deal collectively with 
the federal departments and agencies in which they are employed should 
be protected" (Goldberg, 1962). 
Upon his election, President Kennedy appointed a Task Force 
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chaired by the Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg to develop 
policies related to federal service labor-management relations. By 
late 1961, the Task Force reported to President Kennedy that a special 
program needed to be developed to meet the federal sector needs. The 
Task Force development: (1) recognized the right of federal employees 
and employee organizations to participate in developing improved 
personnel policies and working conditions; (2) recommended that 
employee organizations be consulted and that under specified 
conditions management be authorized to enter into agreements with 
unions; (3) called for regularizing arbitration procedures in handling 
individual employee grievances; (4) requested legislation to authorize 
voluntary withholding of dues; and (5) recommended the nomination by 
the Secretary of Labor, when necessary, of panels of expert 
arbitrators to make advisory recommendations as to what constitutes 
appropriate units for negotiating purposes and to supervise 
representation elections (Goldberg, 1962). 
On January 17, 1962, President Kennedy issued and signed 
Executive Order 10988 entitled "Employee-Management Cooperation in the 
Federal Service" - which established the basic pattern of labor and 
management relations in the federal sector (Levine and Hagburg, 
1979). It introduced three levels of union recognition - informal, 
formal and exclusive. In addition, the law established the concepts 
of exclusive bargaining units and regulated agreements in government 
(Levine and Hagburg, 1979). 
As shown in Table II, Executive Order 10988 was superseded by 
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Order No. 11491 signed into law in 1969 by President Richard M. Nixon 
(Levine and Hagburg, 1979). This order introduced several significant 
changes, including the right of federal employees to negotiate binding 
arbitration as the last step in a grievance procedure (Levine and 
Hagburg, 1979). 
In 1975, President Gerald A. Ford amended Executive Order 11491 
with the issuance of E.O. 11838, which required the settlement of 
disputes arising out of unfair labor practices (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). 
The Public Sector 
State Public Labor Laws 
In the United States, the legal endorsement guaranteeing public 
sector employees the rights to union representation in bargaining was 
slow to develop. As Joseph W. Garbarino wrote in 1973: 
Traditionally, in representing the interests of their 
members, associations of public employees engaged primarily in 
lobbying and political activity. They usually limited their 
membership to a single employing jurisdiction such as a state 
or county. At times they did include substantial numbers of 
members from education, but in addition, organizations based 
upon particular occupational groups were formed to speak for 
the interest of particular constituencies (Garbarino, 1973). 
By the late 1960s, the legal right of public employees to 
organize for collective bargaining began in the large metropolitan 
centers of Cincinnati and Philadelphia, with New York establishing a 
formal system of bargaining by executive order in 1958. The first 
state legislation allowing for collective bargaining by state 
employees was enacted by the Wisconsin legislature in 1959. This 
development was further stimulated by President Kennedy's Executive 
Order 10988, issued in 1962 (Garbarino, 1973). As the president of 
AFSCME, Jerry Wurf, said in 1966: 
His [President Kennedy's] action, which gave federal 
employees the right to organize and set an example that has 
been followed by many states, counties, and cities, probably 
was a major contributing factor in the rapid growth of the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(Wurf, 1966). 
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The pattern of legislation on public sector collective bargaining 
that has emerged from the several states is one characterized by a 
noticeable lack of uniformity in legal requirements and practices. 
This pattern of diversity is due, in large part, to the absence of any 
federal standards governing labor relations for state and local 
government employees, analogous to those set forth in the Wagner Act 
of 1935 governing labor relations in private sector employment. It 
might also be argued that the absence of federal legislation on this 
matter has made it possible for the states to now 'pre-empt the 
regulation of labor relations for state and local government employees 
under a doctrine of States Rights (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). 
Following this line of reasoning, public sector labor law of the 
states has tended to be a reflection of the political values and 
demographic patterns within the various states. As is shown in Table 
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III, by 1978, thirty states had enacted collective bargaining laws 
that covered all or some categories of public employment, while three 
states had no laws pertaining to public sector collective bargaining, 
other states had blanket prohibitions on collective bargaining by 
public employees. 
Collective Bargaining and the University System 
The Entrance of Academic Bargaining 
Into the University System 
As society developed collective bargaining laws for both the 
federal and public sector employees, academic unionism emerged as a 
potent force in higher education (Garbarino, 1973). Joseph W. 
Garbarino wrote in 1973: 
The exclusion to government workers, particularly at the 
state levels, of the right to organize for collective 
bargaining is the most significant single reason for the 
present form and growth of academic unions. Furthermore, 
since education is a function basically of the states, while 
the degree of encouragement among states varies greatly, 
permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the 
burst of academic unions in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Garbarino, 1973). 
Although the legal base for academic unionism was developed, 
collective bargaining was slow to enter the 4-year institution of 
higher education. The rationale for this slower growth rate in the 
university system has been identified by labor relations scholars as 
Kind of Bargaining Law 
(1) Comprehenalve Law 
(2) Heet and Confer Lava 
(3) No Law 
Table II I 
A Summary of the Characterlstlca of the HaJor 
Lawa Enacled In the Public Sector by 
1978 (Levine & Hagburg. 1979) 
Scope of Lew State. Covered by Law 
Broad-scope collective bargaining 
on wages. hours and employment 
conditions for the state snd local 
government employees. 
Full-scope bargaining law for local 
government employees only. 
Full-acope bargalnlng laws for 
state employeea. 
Limited form of collective 
bargaining for .t.te employees. 
These lawa exclude wage and benefita 
from bargaining. 
Law for local governancea whose 
governing bodies opt for coversge. 
A weak law that covera state and 
local employees; It Is limited to 
"meet and confer" requirements 
rather thsn bargaining. 
No applicable negotiation procedures 
available for either state or local 
employees. 
Connecticut 
lIawaU 
Iowa 
Halne 
Haooachuaetta 
Hlnneoota 
Hontana 
Nebraska 
MIchigan 
Nevada 
Oklahoma 
Alaaka 
Delaware 
Vermont 
Waohlngton 
Delaware 
California 
florida 
Kanaas 
Hlasourl 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Ohio 
New Hampahlre 
New Jereey . 
New York 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode leland 
South Dakota 
Wlaconsln 
Vermont 
WashIngton 
W 
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threefold: 
(1) The elite institutions of higher education have 
continued to support the concept of the traditional shared 
governance mode to implement the employment relationships 
between the faculty and university, (2) in such quality 
institutions as the Ivy League schools, the prestigious public 
and private research institutions, and select liberal arts 
colleges, the professor is perceived as a master, not 
employee; therefore, an academician does not need a surrogate 
to plead the "master case" with the university system, and (3) 
the academy has lived with myths about academic unionism 
(Hagengruber, 1978; Polishook, 1982). 
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This rationale is further supported by the 1972 study 
IIProfessors, Union and Higher Education ll conducted by Everett Ladd and 
Seymour Lipset. The data reported in their study concluded that: 
Forty-three percent of the faculty sampled agreed that the 
growth of unionization of college and university faculty is 
beneficial and should be extended, while 44 percent disagreed, 
and 13 percent entertained conflicting assessments (Ladd and 
Lipset, 1973). 
The study supported, as shown in (Appendix B), the 1969 Carnegie 
Commission on Higher Education survey findings that faculty members' 
selection of bargaining in the university system is based upon two 
independent sources: (1) class interest, and (2) ideology. As Ladd 
and Lipset (1973) stated: 
Professors of low scholarly achievement give greater backing 
to the principle of collective bargaining than do their most 
productive colleagues; untenured professors more than those 
with tenure; and academicians with low salaries are more 
supportive than their bett~r rewarded associates (Ladd and 
Lipset, 1972). 
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Furthermore, the general political views of the academicians are 
significant factors in the selection of collective bargaining as a 
supplemental governance mode for the university system. As Ladd and 
Lipset reported: "Eighty percent of the professors scoring on the 
liberal-quintile of the Liberalism-Conservative score, concurred that 
faculty strikes are legitimate means of collective action" (Ladd and 
Lipset, 1973). 
The Scope of Academic Collective Bargaining 
The United States Merchant Marine Academy is reported as the 
first 4-year institution of higher education to accept collective 
bargaining. A private school, the Academy was organized in 1966 by 
the American Federation of Teachers. However, academic unions did not 
attract public attention until 1969, when the collective bargaining 
process was introduced into the public university system in the City 
University of New York. This opportunity was provided for the faculty 
members of CUNY, as professionals, by the 1967 passage of the Taylor 
Law in New York State (Garbarino, 1973). It was a law which, 
according to Donald H. Wollett: "Provided for collective negotiation 
by state, county and municipal employees, including employees of any 
governmental units operating a public school, college or university" 
(Wollett, 1971). 
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Since the initial battle cry, "Professors Unite," in 1969 by 
Myron Lieberman, a faculty member of CUNY, academic unionism has shown 
a dramatic growth in the 4-year institutions of higher education 
(Garbarino, 1973). As shown in Table IV, from the data prepared by 
The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher 
Education and the Professions of Baruch College, City University of 
New York, the major growth years for academic unionism in the 4-year 
institutions were the mid to late 1970s, as well as 1981. 
TABLE IV (Douglas, 1984) 
GROWTH OF UNIONIZATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, 1974-1983 
Academic Collective Bargaining Agents and Agreements 
In 1984, as shown in Table V, there was a total of 134 recognized 
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bargaining agents in the 4-year institutions of higher education. Of 
this number, 71 are listed in public institutions, while 63 were 
reported in private institutions. At the same time, as Table VI 
demonstrates, 64 agreements were reported in the public institutions 
and 54 agreements were reported for the private schools. 
TABLE V (Douglas, 1984) 
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The growth of academic unionism has been attributed to three 
major national organizations that have actively competed for faculty 
support in collective bargaining elections (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). 
These external organizations, the American Federation of Teachers, the 
National Teachers Association and the American Association of 
University Professors were identified by William T. McHugh (1971) as: 
having a more practical appeal because they are better 
equipped to organize and promote collective bargaining than 
are local senates or traditional governance organizations 
because: (1) senates are often comprised of students or 
employees who do not share a community of interests with 
faculty in a collective bargaining sensej (2) they have money, 
trained staff lawyers, and other resources necessary to 
organize, campaign, and utilize the legal machinery of labor 
acts; and (3) they are willing to represent the particular 
cause of an individual faculty member (McHugh, 1971). 
While these national organizations share a common goal in the 
university system, the interpretation and implementation of collective 
bargaining statutes, as Table VII shows, each organization, as an 
academic union, has a unique profile. 
In January 1984, as shown in Table VIII, these three national 
external organizations continue to represent the majority of faculty 
members in the 137 4-year unionized institutions. While the AAUP 
represents 40 institutions of the 134 schools in higher education, the 
AFT is agent for 31 of the schools and the NEA represents 33 groups. 
Organization 
TIle American Federation 
of Teachers 
(AFT) 
The Nstionsl Education 
Association 
(NEA) 
The American Association 
of University Professors 
(AAUP) 
TABLE VII 
The Major National Organizations As Representatives 
of 4-Year Inlltitutions in Collect:1ve Bargaining 
Negotiations (Garbarino, 1973; Douglas, 1984) 
Entry Year Into 
Higher Education 
Bargaining 
1967 
1968 
1966 
Orgsnlzation Profile 
This organization is recognized as the pioneer of faculty 
unionism. Its most distinctive feature is the long-
standing link with organized labor; it hss chsmpioned the 
trade union model in education. The AFT has been 
strongest in public 4-year colleges in the industrial 
states. 
In this orgsnization. the independent members are enrolled 
into three levels of membership--nstional. stste and 
local--with the key structure of the organization at the 
state level. The NEA strength in the 4-year college 
has been almost entirely in former teacher colleges. 
psrtlcularly in the state of Pennsylvania. 
The association developed in 1972 a "Statement on Collec-
tive Bargaining" to justify the association involvement in 
the collective bargaining process. These justifications 
are based upon the association's commitment to the fact 
that: 
a. The shaping of collective bargaining should not be 
left to organizattons lacking dedication to principles 
developed by the Association and widely accepted by the 
academic community. 
b. The Association is influential in the shaping of 
collective bargaining, the principles of academic freedom 
and tenure and the primary responsibility of a faculty for 
determining academic policy will be secured. 
c. The implementation of Association-supported prin-
ciples, based upon the profession's traditions and moral 
suasion can be effectively supplemented by a collective 
bargaining agreement and given the force of law. w 
<Xl 
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While in the public institution, the AAUP is the most common elected 
bargaining agent, in the private institutions, the AFT is the agent of 
choice. 
Table VIII (Douglas, 1984) 
Analysis of Bargaining Agents and Collective 
Bargaining Agreements 
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The Subject of Contract Negotiations 
in Academic Bargaining 
The formal collective bargaining procedure as accepted in the 
university system of higher education is a process intended to 
contractually attain participation in academic governance. As William 
F. McHugh (1971) wrote, 
Academic Collective Bargaining is a formal procedure which 
insures appropriate consultation and opportunity for the 
professional staff to present ideas and attitudes to the 
governing boards or other sources of authority are appearing 
in contracts (McHugh, 1971). 
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However, the negotiation of a contractura1 agreement in the 
academy requires that established labor laws be adjusted to the unique 
university governance structure (Schwartzman, 1974). Furthermore, in 
academic collective bargaining, where the application of these 
principles presents unique problems, (Glidden, 1977) the contract 
according to Herbert D. Schwartzman, must: 
Determine not only the relative rights, duties and obligations 
of the contracting parties, but also the effect of the 
collective bargaining relationship upon the governance 
structure of the university. Conversely, where such matters 
as appointment, promotion, tenure, discharge, etc., are 
subject to peer judgment, the collective bargaining agreement 
should not provide a means of obviating, by arbitration or 
otherWise, an adverse decision by the peers or the reviewing 
bodies in the governance structure (Schwartzman, 1974). 
For the faculty member with an appointment in the academy, the 
"terms and conditions" of employment have been defined to include the 
traditional issue of collective bargaining, as well as a wider 
spectrum of subjects than are usually found in public employee 
contracts (McHugh, 1971). The scope of these subjects is rooted in 
the concept of shared authority a concept, according to William F. 
McHugh (1971), that: 
Faculty should share in the governance of the institution. 
Thus, the concept of negotiable issues covers everything from 
admission, class size, academic calendar, procedures for 
budget formulation, participation in physical plant planning 
and expansion, allocation of resources, to athletic policy and 
procedures for selection of administrators and department 
chairmen. This concept of "shared authority," peculiar to 
educational institutions, includes a wider spectrum of matters 
than customarily associated with industry or public employment 
bargaining (McHugh, 1971). 
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The right of the academician to a wider spectrum of bargaining 
subjects in the university system was fully supported by the American 
Association of University Professors' "Statement on Government of 
Colleges and Universities" as formulated in 1966 in collaboration with 
the American Council on Education and the Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges. This "Statement" called for a 
mutual understanding regarding the governance of an institution, 
stressing the principles of shared governance as significant to the 
academy in contemporary times (AAUP, 1984). This position justified 
faculty responsibilities to participate in academic governance 
because: 
Faculty judgment is central to general educational policy. 
Furthermore, scholars in a particular field or activity have 
the chief competence for judging the work of their col~eagues, 
in such competence it is Unplicit that responsibility exists 
for both adverse and favorable judgment. Likewise there is 
the more general component of experience, faculty personnel 
committees having a broader charge (Sands, 1971). 
Furthermore, the American Association of University Professors' 
1969 "Statement of Policy on Representation of Economic and 
Professional Interests," detailed that: 
Through the negotiation of a collective agreement it may in 
some institutions be possible to create a proper environment 
for faculty and administration to carry out their respective 
functions and to provide for the eventual establishment of 
necessary instruments of shared authority and responsibility 
in purely educational, curricular and legislative matters 
(Sands, 1971). 
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In 1971, Do~ald H. Wollett further characterized issues related 
to academic contract negotiation into four major categories of faculty 
concerns, during an address to the National Conference of Collective 
Negotiation in New York. As shown in Table IX, the five major 
categories of issues presented were: (1) procedures for faculty 
representation; (2) educational policies; (3) working conditions and 
the administration of personnel policies; (4) aggregate economic 
issues; and (5) public issues and the institution. 
Five Major Categories 
1. Procedure for Faculty 
Representation 
2. Educational Policy 
3. Working Condltlonsl 
Personnel Policies 
4. Aggregate Economic 
Issues 
5. Public Issues and the 
Institute 
TABLE IX 
The Specific Issues Relative to the Five 
Major Categories of Academic Contract 
Negotiations (Wollett, 1971) 
Specific "Is5ue~ of the Category 
The right to participate in the formulation of the organic law 
that defines the nature of their representation with the 
Institution. 
These Issues include: academic standards, curriculum, degree 
requirements, grading standards, standards of academic freedom, 
standards for "student conduct and discipline, procedures for the 
appointment of administrative personnel. 
Ttlese issues include: appointment, promotion, tenure. course 
assignments, work schedules, work load, salaries and fringe 
benefits, office space, secretaries, service and grievance 
proced~res. 
These Issues Inc lude: the allocat Ion of resources to major 
budgetary categories, salaries and fringe benefits and the 
allocation of funds to support the major educational objectives 
of the Institution. 
The right to participate In the formation of Institutional 
policies related to public questions that have a direct and 
Important effect on the operation of the institution. 
.p. 
W 
Collective Bargaining in the Oregon System of 
Higher Education: Focus on the 4-Year Institutions 
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In 1973, Oregon enacted significant comprehensive bargaining laws 
for the educator as a public employee. These laws permitted faculty 
members with an appointment in an Oregon 4-year institution of higher 
education to select collective bargaining as a supplemental governance 
mode for their participation in institutional governances (Garbarino, 
1973) • 
Since 1973, three of Oregon's eight 4-year institutions of higher 
education have entered into collective bargaiing. The initial 
contract was implemented in 1975 at Southern Oregon State College. In 
1979, additional academic collective bargaining contracts were 
implemented for faculty members at Western Oregon State College and 
Portland State University (Douglas, 1984). 
Faculty members at Southern Oregon State College are represented 
by an independent agent, while the American Federation of Teachers was 
chosen to represent Western Oregon State College and the American 
Association of University Professors was elected as the bargaining 
agent for Portland State University. 
In addition, five "no-agent" faculty elections have been reported 
between 1975 and 1983 at other 4-year institutions of higher education 
in Oregon. Coalitions were defeated in 1975 at Oregon Institute of 
Technology and during 1977 at the University of Oregon, Eastern Oregon 
State College and Oregon State University. A second loss for a 
collective bargaining election was reported in 1983 at Oregon State 
College (Douglas, 1984). 
The Effects of Academic Collective Bargaining 
in the University System 
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Since 1966, acceptance of academic collective bargaining as a 
supplemental governance mode has grown in the university system of 
higher education. As Jack L. Nelson, a Rutger's University professor, 
wrote in 1982: "The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in 
the number of states, institutions, and individual faculty members 
operating under collective bargaining agreements" (Nelson, 1982). 
Therefore, the myths that initially challenged the acceptance of 
collective bargaining by the academy have, according to Irwin H. 
Polishook: 
Given way to mature relationships based upon the acceptance of 
collective bargaining by the administration and a mutual 
commitment to use the process to protect the integrity of the 
university (Polishook, 1982) • 
. The research of Begin, (1974) Kemerer and Baldridge, (1976) 
Mortimer, et al. (1976) and Lee, (1979) as well as the scholarly 
contributions of Nelson (1982) and Polishook (1982) further support 
the selection of collective bargaining by faculty members as a 
positive supplemental governance mode for the university system. 
Their studies have documented that while collective bargaining is a 
form of adversarial governance, it has not fostered disharmony in the 
university system. Furthermore, academic collective bargaining has 
established faculty unions and faculty governance bodies as partners 
in a reciprocal process that has supported, clarified, and enhanced 
institutional governance structure, in order to guarantee or advance 
faculty rights. As Jack L. Nelson wrote in 1982: 
While there were some initial problems, collective bargaining 
actually clarified the decision-making process and a number of 
previously ambiguous topics in academia. Collective 
bargaining is one of the few ways to bring some semblance of 
balance into academic decision-making (Nelson, 1982). 
In 1979, the study of Barbara A. Lee further identified the 
position of academic collective bargaining as a positive force on 
governance structures in the university system. Eight major 
conclusions confirmed that: 
(1) Faculty as a whole gained formal governance power through 
the union contract. Even on campuses where faculty had 
enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract 
legitimated and in many cases broadened the scope of the 
faculty's governance role. 
(2) Administrators at the vice presidential level and 
presidential level acquired greater authority over formal 
decisions, particularly in personnel matters, many of which 
had once been made by deans and "rubber-stamped" by 
administrators at higher levels. Contracts now stipulated 
decision responsibility and accountability at levels above the 
dean. 
(3) Deans appeared to have lost much of their autonomy over 
personnel and workload decisions; however, they retained much 
46 
of their authority to allocate budgets. 
(4) The single most significant effect of unionization at the 
six institutions visited was the promulgation of a formal 
grievance procedure. This process resulted in promotion and 
tenure policies generally considered to be fairer and more 
consistent than practices prior to unionization. 
(5) At institutions where senates were relatively new or had 
minimal faculty support, senates were abolished and replaced 
with union-dominated faculty committees. At institutions with 
traditionally strong faculty senates, unions respected senate 
prerogatives and focused on economic issues. At these latter 
institutions, senate and union leadership overlapped. 
(6) On campuses that had a tradition of faculty participation 
in governance, union influence appeared minimal. However, it 
was evident that external threats against faculty autonomy or 
a reversal of the administration's cooperative attitude would 
energize and strengthen the union. 
(7) Unionization tended to formalize relationships between 
faculty and administration, regardless of the quality of these 
relationships. This formalization reduced the ability of an 
individual to influence decision-making by informal means. 
(8) Departments, as academic units, either retained their 
former decision-making power or gained additional power as a 
result of unionization. Nearly all academic and most 
personnel decisions were made at this level and usually 
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prevailed (unless prevented by budget restrictions). Because 
the grievance process usually started with the chairperson or 
the dean, departmental decisions seldom were challenged except 
on due process grounds (Lee, 1979). 
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The forthcoming study of Kemerer and Baldridge will identify four 
positive trends that have occurred in the university system as a 
result of academic collective bargaining. The trends, as reported in 
1980 by J. Victor Baldridge support that: 
(1) The collective bargaining process standardized procedures 
in personnel practices for the academicians, with the benefits 
to them identified as: (a) order to the system, and (2) 
increased equity. 
(2) The collective bargaining process helped the economic 
status of the profession. The bargaining process seems to 
have generated additional money. 
(3) The collective bargaining process resulted in the 
so-called "dual track" relationship between faculty senates 
and unions, whereby senates serve faculty members' academic 
interests and unions serve their economic concerns, remaining 
viable at campuses that have both unions and senates. 
(4) The collective bargaining process may be an incentive to 
the "decentralization" of administrative powers and authority 
(Baldridge, 1982). 
Twenty years of empirical study by the academy has disproved the 
initial myths and concerns about the adoption of collective bargaining 
in the university system; therefore, in 1983, according to Irwin H. 
Polishook: 
The real "adversary" within the academic cOIlUllunity is the 
individual who continues to perpetuate a mythology of faculty 
unions without coming to grips with the practice of a decade 
(Polishook, 1982). 
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Chapter III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology and procedures 
selected for the conduct of this evaluative research survey. The 
presentation will include a review of the (1) research model, 
(2) research methodology, and (3) procedures specific to the study, 
which includes a discussion of the (a) research instrument, 
(b) population, (c) data collection, and (d) the data analysis 
selected for the study. 
The Research Model: Synthesis of Theory and Fact 
Introduction 
The research model for this study was developed from the 
comprehensive literature review as presented in Chapter II. Scholarly 
contributions and research studies, which cite academic collective 
bargaining as a supplemental governance mode adapted in the university 
system to support faculty members' participation in institutional 
governance, were used to design the theoretical framework for this 
research study. Specifically, the literature supports: 
(A) A relationship between the faculty members' demographic 
profile (professional status and academic appointment) and 
their endorsements of academic collective bargaining (Ladd 
and Lipset, 1973; Garbarino and Aussieker, 1975; Wollett, 
1971). 
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(B) A relationship between the influence of contextual factors 
on a university system's structures/function and the 
decision of a faculty to select academic collective 
bargaining as a supplemental mode in lieu of the traditional 
forms of institutional governance (Begin, 1978; Kemerer and 
Baldridge, 1975; Morttmer and Richardson, 1977; Lee, 1979). 
(C) The relationship of academic collective bargaining as a 
supplemental governance mode for the university system and 
the support that the process should provide for faculty 
members to participate in decision-making issues related to 
institutional governance (Baldridge, 1982; Hedgepeth, 1974; 
Lee, 1979; Nelson, 1982; Polishook, 1982). 
The design for the research model, as shown in Figure 3, was 
based upon three fundamental assumptions regarding the adoption of 
academic collective bargaining as a supplemental institutional 
governance mode in a university system. These assumptions include 
(1) demographic factors, (2) contextual factors, and (3) those issues 
related to a faculty member's professional rights to participate in 
institutional governance. 
Demographic Factors 
This section of the study was developed to assess the demographic 
factors (professional status and academic appointments) of those 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE SET 
I Coliective Bargaining I 
Demographic Factors Con t ext u a I Factors 
1. Professional Status 1. External Forces 
2. Professional Academic 2. Internal Forces 
Appointment 
~ ~ / 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE SET 
~ I. tI 1 Institutional Governance 
/ \ 
Professional Economic Interests Educational Academic and 
Interest Resources alrocated Policies Personnel Policie 
1. Research for the: 1."Teaching 1. Academic Duties 
2. Scholarship 1. Total Institution 2. Programs 2. Academic Standards 
3. Peer Judgment 2. Academician Security 3. Students 3. Employment Conditions 
~udgetary Categories 
Figure 3. A schematic diagram of the theoretical research model 
V1 
N 
academicians who have endorsed academic unionism for one of Oregon's 
4-year institutions of higher education. 
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In the university system, there are two major sets of demographic 
factors: (1) class interest, and (2) political orientation, which can 
be used to profile those academicians who tend to support academic 
collective bargaining. 
Most faculty members who select academic collective bargaining as 
a supplemental governance mode hold an appointment in a 4-year 
institution identified with a lower scholarly prestige, fewer 
financial resources and economic benefits. Furthermore, these 
academicians usually hold a lower academic rank, lack tenure, are 
younger and perceive themselves as liberal in political 
issues/attitudes (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). 
For this study, the following demographic ·factors were included 
in the research design: 
1. The academic department/school. 
2. Academic rank. 
3. The number of years of teaching in a 4-year institution. 
4. AAUP membership. 
5. Salary. 
6. Appointment to a university/department academic governing 
committee. 
7. Age range. 
8. The amount of involvement with the collective bargaining 
process. 
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Contextual Factors 
For this section of the study, the research model was designed to 
identify the contextual factors, either external or internal to the 
university system of employment, which influenced faculty members to 
select academic bargaining as a supplemental governance mode. 
Contextual factors are forces, either external or internal to a 
university system, which have the potential to influence both 
structural and functional changes within a system. Consequently, 
these changes can directly impact the governance structures of the 
institution, which includes: (1) the locus of decision-making, (2) the 
amount of bureaucratic regulations, and (3) the degree of faculty 
autonomy within an institution (Lee, 1979). 
Two specific sets of issues related to: (1) external factors and 
(2) internal forces, which have the potential to impact the structure 
and function of a university system, were developed in the research 
model for this segment of the study. 
Institutional Governance 
Academic institutional governance is a process that refers to the 
formal structure and activities used in a university system to make 
those decisions that affect relationships, procedures, and policies 
(Duryea and Fisk, 1973). 
As shown in Figure 4, the concept of academic institutional 
governance is used to form the dependent variable set of the research 
model. For this study, the dependent variable set is divided into 
four specific subsets related to governance issues: (1) professional 
interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and 
(4) academic and personnel policies. 
DEPENDENT \J ARIABLE SET 
Institutional Governance 
I \ ~ 
------ Economic Interests Educational 
Re sources alloca ted PolicIes 
Professional 
Interest 
1. Research for the: 1. Teaching 
1. Total Institution 2. Programs 
Academic and 
Personnel Policies 
1. Academic Duties 
2. Academic Standards 
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2. Scholarship 
3. Peer Judgment 2. Academician Security 3. Studenls 
~\
3. Employment Con9~!ions 
3. Budgetary Categories 
--
Figure 4. The dependent variable set of the research 
model 
Professional Interests 
This dependent variable subset of the research model was designed 
to evaluate the impact of the academic collective bargaining process 
as adopted in three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education, on the professional status of university teaching. 
Since the 1960s, shared authority has become an accepted form for 
academic governance for faculty members and administrators in the 
university system. Shared governance stamped with professional status 
the services of the professoriate, thereby making their role more than 
that of employees and strengthened the ancient idea of the university 
as primarily an association of scholars. Furthermore, the concept of 
shared authority became the guiding principle for the development of 
the academic profession, with research and scholarly contribution as 
the major criteria for evaluating the academician's achievement 
(Duryea and Fisk, 1973). 
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In 1966, the academy introduced collective bargaining as a 
supplemental governance mode for the university system. This process 
has accentuated the organizational role of the academician as an 
employee in contrast to the ideal of a professional who is a 
participant in the academic enterprise (Duryea and Fisk, 1973). 
Specific professional interests of the academician included in 
this dependent variable subset are (1) research, (2) scholarship, and 
(3) peer judgment. 
Economic Interests 
This subsection of the dependent variable set was designed t() 
investigate faculty members' participation in the decision-making 
process of those academic governance issues related to economic 
interests. 
Before 1972, the watershed years of academic growth provided the 
academy, as well as the academicians, with "economy gains" in 
salaries, student enrollment, and research funding. However, this 
past decade has shown a steady decline in academic compensation and 
student enrollment, as well as less federal and state funding 
available to the university system. Consequently, the American 
professoriate, while wanting to retain the academy's traditional 
belief that the academicians' salary is not a wage, has decided to 
accept academic unionism to protect its economic interests (Krueger, 
1979). It is a decision that the American Association of University 
Professors recognized as significant and defined in the 1969 
IIStatement Policy on Representation of Economic and Professional 
Interests ll by stating: 
Collective bargaining may play a significant role in 
bringing agreements between faculty and administration on 
economic issues (AAUP, 1984). 
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The scope of faculty members· participation in the governance of 
the institution·s economic issues should include involvement in 
short-range as well as long-term planning regarding budgetary 
decisions for the institution (Mason, 1982). As Henry J. Mason (1982) 
states: 
In the budgetary process, while faculty must keep itself 
available to give advice day to day, it should also seek 
involvements in the planning process. Otherwise, it faces 
the real danger of lost initiative, in which budgets drive 
and control academic plans and programs, rather than the 
reverse (Mason, 1982). 
For the study, three aggregate economic issues related to faculty 
members· rights to participate in the total financial process of the 
institution were included: (1) the total resources available to the 
institution, (2) the distribution of resources allocated to provide 
for the academicians· economic security, and (3) the allocation of 
resources to major budgetary categories. 
Educational Policies 
This particular dependent variable subset was developed to 
measure faculty members' participation in those academic issues of 
institutional governance related to educational policies. 
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In the academic community, tradition has established the right of 
faculty members to be active participants in determining educational 
policies for a university (Sands, 1971). Furthermore, faculty members 
have the primary responsibility to establish those policies and 
procedures that govern the educational process because their judgment 
as educators is central to general educational policy (AAUP, 1984). 
In addition, faculty members have the right and responsibility 
for the establishment of those policies and procedures specific to: 
admission standards, curriculum, teaching method, degree requirements, 
grading standards, types of degrees offered, the establishment of 
programs, as well as those issues related to student life, which 
includes conduct and discipline. 
For the study, three areas of educational policies were included 
in the research model. These areas studied those policies in a 
university system related to (1) teaching, (2) programs, and 
(3) students. 
Academic and Personnel Policies 
This subsection of the dependent variable set was selected for 
inclusion in the study to evaluate the faculty members' participation 
in governance issues related to personnel policies and the working 
conditions of their institution. 
University educators have the primary governance authority for 
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all matters related to faculty status (Sands, 1971). As the 1969 
"Statement on Governance of Colleges and Universities" of the American 
Association of University Professors states: 
Scholars in a particular field or activity have the chief 
competence for judging the work of their colleagues; in such 
competence it is implicit that responsibility exists for 
both adverse and favorable judgments (AAUP, 1984). 
Among the factors that relate to the faculty status of the 
university educator in the area of personnel policies are: 
appointments, promotion, tenure, salary, and teaching schedule. In 
addition, the academician has a right to participate in decisions 
related to the working conditions of his employment, which includes 
the issues of office space or secretarial or support office services 
(Wollett, 1971). 
Three major areas related to the personnel policies and the 
working conditions of unionized faculty members were used in this 
section of the study: (1) academic duties, (2) academic standards, and 
(3) employment conditions. 
The Research Methodology 
An Evaluative Survey 
The purpose of this evaluative research survey was to study 
select faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year 
unionized institutions of higher education to determine whether or not 
collective bargaining has supported faculty members' rights for 
participation in institutional governance. To achieve the stated 
purpose, the following problems were investigated: 
1. Have the professional interests of the academician with an 
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education been affirmed through the collective bargaining 
process? 
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2. Has collective bargaining provided for the academician's 
participation in financial planning and policy-making related 
to the economic interests as an employee in Oregon's 4-year 
institutions of higher education? 
3. Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate 
in determining the educational policies for the institution 
that are related to academic issues? 
4. Has the collective bargaining process provided support for 
the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education rights to participate in determining the academic 
and personnel policies of their employment? 
The research methodology for this study was reviewed for 
compliance with the DREW policies and regulations for the protection 
of human subjects by the Human Subjects Research Review Committee of 
Portland State University. The methodology was approved by the 
committee, as providing adequate provisions to protect the rights and 
welfare of the human subjects (See Appendix C). 
Procedures for the Study 
The Research Instrument 
The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective 
Bargaining As A Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of 
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in 
Institutional Governance" was designed for this evaluative survey to 
include three parts: (1) Respondent Information, (2) Institutional 
Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information. 
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a. Part I - Respondent Information of the questionnaire was 
designed to collect demographic information about the faculty 
members with an appointment in Oregon's three 4-year 
unionized institutions of higher education. The information, 
which includes personal and professional characteristics, was 
used to identify a professional profile of the faculty 
members as an aggregate group and as employees of the three 
unionized institutions. 
The six specific demographic factors included in this 
research design are: (1) the number of years of teaching in 
a 4-year institution, (2) AAUP membership, (3) salary, 
(4) appointment to a university/department, (5) age range, 
and (6) institutional involvement with the collective 
bargaining process. (See Questionnaire items: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6.) 
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b. Part II - Institutional Information of the research 
instrument was a section designed to identify those 
contextual factors, both external and internal to the 
university system, which influenced the faculty members with 
an appointment in Oregon's three unionized 4-year 
institutions of higher education to vote for a new bargaining 
contract in 1983. 
For the research design, those questions related to the 
contextual factors were: (1) student enrollment, (2) state 
and federal funding, (3) institutional growth, (4) a decline 
in academic programs, (5) decentralized policy-making, 
student power, and (6) the effectiveness of the university's 
academic senate/council, organizational structural change. 
(See Questionnaire items: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16,17,18,19.) 
c. Part III - Institutional Governance Information - items were 
36 statements developed to collect data specific to the 
dependent variables set of the research model, institutional 
governance. Four dependent variable subsets: 
(1) professional status, (2) aggregate economic issues, (3) 
educational policies, and (4) working conditions/personnel 
policies were used to study select faculty members with an 
appointment in ·Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education in order to evaluate academic collective bargaining 
as a supplemental governance mode in higher education to: 
1. Affirm the professional status of the academician in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education (See 
Questionnaire items: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.) 
2. Provide for the academic participation in the financial 
planning and policy-making related to the aggregate 
economic factors of Oregon's 4-year institutions of 
higher education. (See Questionnaire items: 28, 29, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.) 
3. Provide for the academicians' participation in 
determining the institution's educational policies 
related to academic issues (See Questionnaire items: 37, 
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43). 
4. Provide for the academicians' participation in 
determining the conditions of employment and personnel 
policies (See Questionnaire items: 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.) 
A Likert five-point scale: (5) strongly agree, (4) agree, 
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(3) undecided, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree was used to 
measure the responses to each item of the questionnaire, except in 
Part III, D. Working Conditions. For this section, a 4-point scale of: 
(4) always, (3) frequently, (2) infrequently, and (1) never was used 
to evaluate collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode to 
provide support for faculty members' right to participate in 
determining those policies related to: (1) Academic Duties, 
(2) Academic Standards/ Personnel Policies, and (3) Support Services. 
The research instrument was designed and developed between 
January 1983 and May 1984, under the direction of Dr. Walter Ellis, 
Chairperson of the investigator's Dissertation Committee. Special 
assistance with the final revision of the instrument was provided by 
Dr. Gary Johnson, a statistician; Dr. Mark Starr, a research 
methodologist; Dr. George Guy, Professor of Education; Dr. Daniel 
O'Toole, Associate Professor of Public Administration; and Dr. Ken 
Kemper, Assistant Professor of Education. 
The Research Population 
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The population selected for this research study, as shown in 
Table X, was 694 faculty members with an academic appointment in one 
of Oregon's three unionized 4-year institutions of higher education, 
spring 1984. Each subject of the identified population met the 
following three criteria, as each: (1) held a full-time faculty 
appointment during the 1983-84 academic year, (2) had been employed by 
the institution a minimum of five years, and (3) had tenure or was on 
a tenure track appointment in the school/department of the 
university. 
The population for this study was identified from the data base 
used for November 8, 1983, payroll tapes and the EEO-6 report Fall 
1983 for the subject institution. This data was provided the 
researcher by Ms. Mary E. Ricks, Research Assistant, of the Office for 
Institutional Research at Portland State University (See Appendix D). 
Although all respondents nominally met the three requirements above, 
TABLE X 
Distribution of the Identified Population for the 
Research Study in Oregon's Three Unionized 
4-Year Institutions of Higher Education 
Four Year Unionized Number in Percentage of the 
Institution Population Total Population 
Western Oregon State 
College 129 ( 18.6%) 
Southern Oregon State 
College 148 (21. 3'7.) 
Portland State 
University 417 (60.1'7.) 
Total 694 (100.0'7.) 
one respondent nevertheless indicated less than 5 years of teaching. 
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In order to secure permission to request the use of the data base, 
the legal ramifications for requesting access to the data were 
discussed with Mr. Michael A. Corn, Ass~stant to the President for 
Legal Affairs, Portland State University. Therefore, permission to 
secure and use the data base to identify the population for the study 
was given to the investigator through the office of Dr. Margaret J. 
Dobson, Vice President, Academic Affairs, Portland State University; 
Dr. James H. Beaird, Provost, Western Oregon State College in Monmouth, 
Oregon; and Dr. Ernest E. Ettlich, Dean of Academic Affairs, Southern 
Oregon State College in Ashland, Oregon (See Appendix E). 
The Data Collection 
On May 21, 1984, the research instrument "A Questionnaire to 
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Study Collective Bargaining As a Process in Oregon's 4-Year 
Institutions of Higher Education to Advance Faculty Members' Rights For 
Participation in Institutional Governance" was mailed to the 694 
subjects identified for this research study. The questionnaire was 
accompanied by a letter and self-stamped envelope for returning the 
completed questionnaire to the investigator (See Appendix F). 
A follow-up post card was mailed to the subjects on May 28, 1984, 
with a second appeal letter, accompanied by a questionnaire and 
self-stamped envelope, mailed on June 4, 1984, to all non-respondents, 
as of that date (See Appendix G). 
Questionnaires were returned to the investigator from 523 or 75.4% 
of the population selected as subjects for the study between May 23, 
1984, and August 10, 1984. As shown in Table XI, 277 or 51.0% of the 
questionnaires were returned from wave one, 100 or 20.6% were returned 
following the second wave, while 109 or 22.4% of the respondent 
questionnaires were returned following the third wave. 
From the 523 questionnaires returned, 486 or 92.9% were accepted 
as data-producing and used in the analysis process of the study. 
However, in the presentation and analysis of the data, faculty 
responses to each category of the research instrument may not total 
486, because the academicians did not always respond to each item of 
the instrument. 
Thirty-seven or 7.1% of the returned questionnaires were rejected 
for use in the study because of: (1) incomplete data, (2) the 
educator, while retaining faculty rank and tenure in the subject 
institution, now holds an administrative position, and (3) the 
TABLE XI 
DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES RECEIVED 
ACCORDING TO EACH WAVE BY EMPLOYING 4-YEAR UNIONIZED 
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN OREGON 
Institution 
Western Oregon State 
College 
Number of Data-Producing Respon •• s 
Received With Each Wave/Request 
Firat Wave Second Wave 
Hay 22-30, Hay 31-
1984 June 5, 1984 
N (7.) N (7.) 
45 (56.3) 18 (22.5) 
Southern Oregon State 47 (47.0) 30 (30.0) 
College 
Por tland St. te 185 (60.5) 52 (11.0) 
University 
Third Wave 
June 6-Augu8t 
10, 1984 
N (7.) 
17 (21.3) 
23 (23.0) 
69 (22.5) 
Total 277 (57.0) 100 (20.6) 109 (22.4) 
questionnaire was received after August 10, 1984. 
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Total 
80 
100 
306 
486 
While 523 faculty members returned the received instruments to the 
investigator, 171 chose to not participate in the study and did not 
return the questionnaire. From the total data available, the 
non-respondents can be profiled, as shown in Table XXII, according to: 
(1) employing institution, (2) academic area of appointment, and 
(3) academic rank. 
Following the selection of usable questionnaires for the study, 
the questions were coded and a "Respondent Codebook - Collective 
Bargaining as a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of 
Higher Education to Support Faculty Members' Participation in 
Institutional Governance" was written for key-punching the data for 
computer analysis (See Appendix H). Missing responses were recorded as 
a9. 
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TABU: XII 
DIS!llIBUl'ION OF -:HE ?ROFt1..E O!A.R.AC':'tRISTIC 
DATA OF TIlE ~ON-i\.ESPONDEN1S 
:ionresponden~~ ~1iI,pondents rocoil 
~'!".) (1..) 
:mployins; !nstltut,1on 
<USC .2 0 •.• ) ,0 (65.5 ) l22 
sese II (23.]) lOO (76.J) Ul 
?SU 98 (2 •• J) 306 (75.7) '-'>. 
roeal lit (26.0) 436 ( 74.0) 557 
::Jepartmenc" 
Liberal Arts/Arc!! e. Sci. llO (27.71 ZS7 (n.J) 397 
?rofesei.onal 32 (24.Z) l63 (75.3) 215 
Ot.her 9 (22.0 ) J2 ( 78.0) .l 
Total lit ( 26.2) '-il2 (73.3) 553 
Academic Rank-
?roies8or 93 (26 •• ) 259 (73.0 ) J52 
A'.ccLate ?rotusor 39 (25.2 ) liS (74.3 ) 234 
A •• 1sCant ?retessor ~ 7 (29.J) 41 (70. ]) 38 
!nllt.%'1Jct.or/Othet" 2 (2.LZ) 7 (77.3) 9 
1'oc.al lit (26.2) 432 (73.3) ;53 
"Four respondents d1c1 noe indic.ate veparcnent or :t.ank 
The Data Analysis 
The data analysis for this study was completed by selecting 
appropriate statistical programs from the (SPSSx) Batch System. Among 
the research statistical techniques selected to study the data were: 
means, percentages, frequency distributions, reliability and ANOVA. 
More precisely, the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test was used to 
further explore the sum scores or to identify sub-groups of the 
respondents whose answers generated significantly different 
sub-scores. 
A complete presentation and analysis of the study's data is 
presented in Chapter IV, with the conclusions drawn from the data 
prese~t~d ~n ~hsp:er V. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Introduction 
Chapter IV deals with the data and findings resulting from the 
study. The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective 
Bargaining As a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of 
Higher Education to Support Faculty Members' Participation in 
Institutional Governance" was used to collect the data for this 
investigation. 
To aid in the presentation and analysis of data, Chapter IV was 
written in two major sections. The first section presents the results 
of the demographic data specific to the three major areas of the 
research instrument: (1) Respondent Information, 2) Institutional 
Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information. 
The second section of Chapter IV presents an analysis of the 
interaction between select independent variables from Part I --
Respondent Information of the research instrument and the dependent 
variables of the research model (1) professional interests, (2) economic 
interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic and personnel 
policies specific to Part III -- Institutional Governance Issues of the 
instrument. This statistical information was used to test the four 
hypotheses of the research study. 
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H:l The collective bargaining process has affirmed the 
professional interests of the academician with an appointment 
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education. 
H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year 
institutions of higher education, has provided for the 
academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making 
process related to the economic interests of the institution. 
H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate 
in determining the institution's educational policy on 
academic issues. 
H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the 
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and 
personnel policies of their employment. 
Respondent Information 
Years Of Full-Time Teaching In A 
4-Year Institution of Higher Education 
Respondents (~= 483) reported a range of less than 5 and more than 
25 years of full-time academic teaching within a 4-year institution of 
higher education. While only 1 respondent had taught in higher 
education for fewer than 5 years, 72 of the total respondents had held 
an academic appointment for more than 25 years. As shown in Table XIII, 
the largest sub-group consists of those respondents who have taught 
between 16-20 years in a 4-year system of higher education. 
TABLE XIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EMPLOYING INSTITUTION 
AND YEARS OF FULL-TIME TEACHING IN A 4-YEAR 
INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Years of Full Time Teaching Years in a 
4-Year Institution of Higher Education 
Oregon's Unionized 
4- Year Institutions 1-4 5-10 1l-15 16-20 21-25 Over 
of Higher Education yrs. yrs. yrs. YTS. yrs. 25 yrs. 
Western Oregon State Col. 6 21 24 19 9 
Southern Oregon State Col. 27 34 27 12 
Portland State University 31 69 87 65 51 
Total Population 37 117 145 III 72 
Membership in The American Association 
of University Professors (AAUP) 
In those Oregon 4-year institutions of higher education where 
academicians have selected collective bargaining as a supplemental 
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governance mode, respondents at Western Oregon State College report only 
a 6.6% membership in AAUP, with a 6.3% membership reported at Southern 
Oregon State College and a 44.9 % membership reported for Portland State 
University. As Table XIV illustrates, the majority of the respondents 
do not hold membership in AAUP. This includes a 55.1% non-membership 
reported by 206 respondents at Portland State Universi~y, where AAUP is 
the collective bargaining agent for faculty members' contracts. 
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TABLE XIV 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EMPLOYING UNIONIZED 
INSTITUTION AND MEMBERSHIP IN (AAUP) AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
Oregon I 5 Unionized 
4-Year rns t i tu t ions 
of Higher Education 
Membership in (AAUP) American Asso-
ciation of University Professors 
Frequencies Percent 
Y N Y N 
Western Oregon State Col. l! (6.6 ) (93.4) 
(N Q 76) 
Southern Oregon State Col. 89 (6.3) (93.7) 
(N • 95) 
Portland State University 133 163 (44.9) (55.11 
(N • 296) 
Total Population 144 323 (30.8) (69.2) 
(N .467) 
Faculty Members' Involvement In Institutional 
Academic Collective Bargaining 
The majority of the respondents reported nonparticipation in their 
institution's academic collective bargaining process. Table XV shows 
the extent of involvement in the collective bargaining process reported 
by respondents in each of the three unionized institutions. 
TABLE XV 
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE COLLECTIVE 
9ARGAINING PROCESS, BY INSTITUTION 
rnvo 1 vemen t 
In the Col-
lective 3ar-
.gaining Process 
Western Oregon 
S tate College 
:!. (~" 
Southern Oregon 
State College 
N (7.) 
Portland State 
University 
N (7.) 
No Involvement 
Slightly Active 
Active 
36 (45.0) 
22 (27.5) 
10 Cl2.5) 
12 Cl5.0) 
(.9 (49.5) 
32 (32.3) 
10 (10.1l 
214 (69.9) 
60 (9.6) 
22 (7.2) 
!/ery Active 8 (8. II 10 (3.3) 
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Analysis of involvement by institution indicates while 27.5% of 
Western Oregon State College faculty respondents were slightly involved 
in the collective bargaining process for their institution, 45% of the 
respondents selected to have no involvement in the process. This same 
pattern of respondent involvement in the bargaining process was reported 
at Southern Oregon State College where 32.3% of the respondents were 
slightly involved in the process and 49.5% of the faculty respondents 
selected no involvement in institutional bargaining. At Portland State 
University, 9.6% of the faculty respondents indicated they were slightly 
involved with the bargaining process; 69.9% have indicated 
nonparticipation in the process. 
Age Of Respondents 
Table XVI shows the distribution of the faculty respondents' age 
range. 
TABLE XVI 
INSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONDENTS BY AGE RANGE 
Employing 4-Year 
Unionized Institution 
Western Oregon State Col. 
Southern Oregon State Col. 
Portland State University 
? 2 15.8, df s 6: p 2 .015 
30-39 
yrs. 
N (1.) 
40-49 
yr •• 
N (1.) 
SO-59 
yr •• 
N ("I.) 
60 or 
above 
N ("I.) 
Total 
N (l~) 
2 (2.5) 29 (36.5) 43 (53.5) 6 0.5) 80 (100) 
3 (3.0) 43 (43.0) 42 (42.0) 12 (12.0) 100 (100) 
25 (8.2) III (36.3) 115 (37.8) 55 (17.9) 306 (100) 
N 2 486 
The respondents' age range in the study was from 30 to more than 60 
years. The greatest percentage of Western Oregon State College 
respondents are in the 50-59 year age range. While at both Southern 
Oregon College (~= 43) and Portland State University (n = 115) the 
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greatest number of the respondents reported their age in the 40-49 
range. 
Furthermore, as Table XVII illustrates, while the largest number of 
respondents holding the academic rank of professor were between 50-59 
years of age, the largest group of associate professors who responded to 
this question were between 40-49 years of age. 
TABLE XVII 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY 
ACADEMIC RANK AND AGE RANGE 
Age 
30-39 40-49 
Academic Rank yrs. yrs4 
Professor 5 75 
Assoc 1a te Prof easer 20 83 
Ass is tant Prof esscr 3 20 
Instructor I I 
Other. I 2 
Total Population 30 181 
50-59 
yrs. 
123 
61 
13 
2 
199 
60 or 
over 
56 
11 
5 
72 
University/Departmental Academic 
Governance Bodies 
Total 
259 
175 
41 
2 
4 
482 
From the total population for the study (! = 486), during the 
1983-84 academic year, 259 respondents were appointed to a university or 
departmental governance committee. 
Membership in the Faculty Academic Senete was held by 28.1% of the 
Western Oregon State College respondents, by 33.3% of the 54 Southern 
Oregon State College total respondents and by 29.1% of the 148 Portland 
State University respondents. 
While only 14.0% of the Western Oregon State College respondents 
and 20.4% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents were members 
of the institution's Rank and Tenure Committee, 33.1% of Portland 
State's faculty respondents were appointed to this committee. 
Faculty respondents, as shown in Table XVIII, were least 
represented by membership appointment to the Institutional Finance 
Committees. At Portland State University, 3.4% of the respondents held 
an appointment to the committee, while 8.8% of Western Oregon State 
College and 5.6% of Southern Oregon State College respondents reported 
an appointment to their Institutional Finance Committee(s). 
bble XVIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ay UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL 
COVERNAllCE BODIES AllD THE EMPLOYING INSTITUTION 
?or1:1and 
Wes tern Oregon Southern Oregon State 
University Depart- State College State College University 
.,ental Academic 
Governance Bodies ~ (1.) N (':'.) N (7.) 
Faculty Academic 
Senate 16 (28.1) 18 (33.3) 43 (29.1) 
Finance Committee 5 (8.8) (5.6 ) (3.4) 
Rank and Tenure 
Committee 8 (14.0) 11 (20.4) 49 (33.1) 
Other Policy-Making 
Committe. 28 (49.1) 22 (40.7) 51 (34.5) 
Total 57 S4 148 
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Further analysis indicates that the greater number (136) of the 259 
respondents reporting an appointment to a governing committee (either in 
the department or university), held the academic rank of professor. The 
faculty respondent membership on the four governance committees listed 
on the research instrument: (1) faculty academic senate, (2) finance, 
(3) rank and tenure, and (4) other policy-making committees are shown in 
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Table XIX. 
During the 1983-84 academic year, in addition to the three specific 
governance committees used for the research instrument, respondents 
reported membership on such other policy-making committees as: 
(1) Academic Requirements, (2) Curriculum, (3) Committee on 
Committees, (4) Teacher Education, and (5) Graduate Studies. 
TABLE XIX 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY ACADEMIC 
RANK AND UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL 
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE COMMUTtES 
University Depart-
Associate Assistant Instructor/ 
Professor Professor Professor Other 
mental Academic 
Governance Committees N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) 
Faculty Academic 
Senate 42 (30.9) 24 (26.4) 9 (34.6) 1 
Finance Committee 9 (6.6) 2 (2.2) 2 (7.7) 
-
Rank and Tenure 
Ccmmittee 37 (27.2) 24 (26.4) 5 (19.2) 
-
Other Pol1cy-Mak ing 
Committee 48 (35.3) 41 (45.1) 10 (38.5) 
-
Total 136 91 26 
Salary 
In the questionnaire seven intervals were provided to determine the 
salary range of the faculty respondents on a 9-month academic year 
contract during the 1983-84 academic year. The respondents reported 
salaries ranging from $10,000 to more than $40,000 for 1983-84 academic 
year contracts. While two respondents reported a salary between 
$10,000-$15,000 range, 176 of the respondents earned between 
$26,000-$30,000. Table XX provides a summary of the salary range. 
Salary rntervaLs 
Dollar./9 month. 
10,000-15,000 
16,000-20, 000 
21,000- 25 ,000 
26,000-30,000 
31,000-35,000 
36,000-40,000 
40 ,OOO-over 
Total 
TABLE :c< 
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY SALARIES 
~umber , 
14 
129 
176 
108 
40 
13 
482* 
*H1ssing values. 4 
Percent. 
0.4 
2.9 
26.7 
36.5 
22.4 
8.3 
2.7 
100 
77 
Table XXI reports salaries by institution. The table reveals while 
two or 2.0% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents are in' the 
$10,000-$15,000 salary range, 50 faculty respondents or half of their 
total respondents have salaries ranging from $26,000-$30,000. Portland 
State University also reported the greatest percentage, 33.6%, of the 
1983-84 respondents' salary contracts were in the $26,000-$30,000 
interval. Western Oregon State College respondents reported 37 or 47.4% 
of the total respondents' salaries were between $21,000-$25,000 for 9 
months, with 24 or 30.8% of the faculty respondents reporting a salary 
of $26,000-$30,000. 
TABLE XXI 
SALARY DISTRIBUTION FOR FACULTY RESPONDENTS 
BY EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION 
Salary Interval 
Do11aro/9 month 
10,000-15, 000 
16,000-20,000 
21,000-25,000 
26,000-30,000 
31,000-35,000 
36,000-40,000 
over 40.000 
Total 
Western Oregon 
State College 
N (1.) 
3 0.8) 
37 (47.4) 
24 (30.8) 
6 (7.7) 
7 (9.0) 
1 (1.3) 
78 
Southern Oregon Portland State 
State College University 
N (1.) N (1.) 
2 2.0 
1 (t.0) 10 (3.3) 
26 (26.0) 66 (21. 7) 
50 (50.0) 102 (33.6) 
19 (19.0) 83 (27.3) 
2 (2.0) 31 (10.2) 
12 (3.9) 
100 304 
Further examination of the salary ranges shows that in all three 
academic areas the greatest percentage of the faculty respondents 
employed are within the salary interval of $26,000-$30,000 for the 
1983-1984 academic year on a 9 month's contract. The percentages of 
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faculty respondents in the $26,000-$30,000 salary interval by academic 
areas were: Liberal Arts, 38.6%; Professional ~chools, 34.0%; Others 
32.2% (See Table XII). 
TABLE XXII 
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY BY ACADEMIC AREA 
FOR FACULTY RESPONDENTS 
Academic Area 
Liberal Arts: 
Collegel 
Departmentl Professional 
Salary Interval School School Others 
Dol1ars/9 month. ~ (1.) ~ ('!.) ~ (1.) 
10,000-15,000 1 (0.4) 1 (0.6) 
16,000-20,000 6 (2.1) 5 (3.1) 3 (9.71 
21,000-25,000 87 (30.5) 32 ( 19.8) 9 (29.0) 
26,000-30,000 llO (38.6) 55 (34.0) 10 (32.3) 
31,000-35.000 61 ( 21.4) 40 (24.7) 6 (19.4) 
36.000-40,000 13 (4.6) 24 (14.8) 3 (9.71 
over 40 ,000 7 (2.5) 5 (3.1) 
Total 285 162 31 
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Additional analysis revealed that of the 478 faculty respondents 
reporting their salary ranges, 37.2% or 96 of the respondents with the 
academic rank of professor earned between $26,000-$30,000 for a 9 
months' academic year appointment. While 80 or 46.2% of the respondents 
with the academic rank of associate professor earned between 
$21,000-$25,000,67.5% or 27 of the respondents holding the rank of 
assistant professor were employed in the same salary range. Table XXIII 
presents respondents' salaries within the four academic ranks of the 
university system. 
TAllLE :<XIII 
SALARY INTERVAL DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY 
RESPONDENTS BY ACADEMIC RANK 
Academlc Rank 
AssOCiate Aseistant [n9truetorl 
Salary Interval Professor ?rofessor ?roiessor Other 
Oollarsl9 month. t:!. (;.) t:!. (?) !!. (7.) N (~.) 
10,000-15,000 1 (0,4) 1 (0.0) 
16,000-20,000 2 (0,8) 6 (3.5 ) 4 (10,0) 1 ( 1.0) 
21,000-25,000 18 (7,0) 80 (46.2) Z7 (67,S) 
-
(2,0) 
26,000-30,000 96 ()7 ,2) 74 (42.S) 4 (10,0) 1 ( 1.0) 
31. 000- 35,000 95 (36.8) 7' (4.0) 4 (10.0) 
-
(1.0 ) 
36 ,000 -40 ,000 34 ( U,2) 5 (2.9) 1 ( 2.5) 
over 40 ,000 12 (4,7) 
Total 258 173 40 
Institutional Influences 
Introduction 
The data for the second main area of the research instrument are 
presented to identify those contextual factors, either external or 
internal to a 4-year university system, which were perceived in 1983 to 
be an influencing factor in faculty respondents' decision to vote for a 
new institutional academic collective bargaining contract. 
Those faculty respondents voting for a new institutional contract 
responded to 13 statements on the research instrument. The issues 
specific to each statement had the potential to affect the governance 
structure and functions of the institution. Using a 5-point Likert 
Scale, voting faculty respondents recorded their response to the 13 
listed factors as an influencing or non-influencing factor in their 
decision to vote for a contract renewal. 
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A total presentation of the respondents' data specific to each of 
the 13 statements is illustrated by Table XXIV (See Appendix I). The 
frequency of response, as well as the percentage based upon the total 
number of responses for each statement, is presented. 
The data can be further statistically analyzed to present 
additional important findings specific to each of four data subsets: 
(1) funding, (2) decision-making process/bodies, (3)organizational 
change, and (4) students. These findings are as follows: 
(1) Funding - the impact that federal, state, or institutional 
funding had on the conduct of faculty research or program development in 
the subject institution formed questions 8, 9, 11 of the research 
instrument. 
While 114 of the faculty members were in disagreement with 
statement 9, "Federal funds appropriated for research have been 
reduced," III of the 419 respondents were undecided about the statement 
as a contextual factor of significance to them in voting for contract 
renewal in 1983. 
Statements 8 and 11, as shown in Table XXV, were reported as 
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significant contextual factors in the respondents' decision to vote for 
a contract renewal. At Southern Oregon State College, 42 of the total 
90 respondents and 104 of the 261 respondents from Portland State 
University reported they strongly agree with statement 8, "State 
legislative funding was reduced for your institution." Furthermore, the 
importance of state funding as an influencing force is agreed upon by 
104 of the Portland State University respondents and 33 of the 72 
respondents from Western Oregon State College. 
Statement 11, "Limited instructional funds have decreased the 
development of academic programs" was reported as a significant 
contextual factor for 177 of the 423 respondents voting in 1983 for a 
contract renewal. A further analysis of the statement by academic 
institution (See Table XXV) shows the statement was of significance to 
faculty members holding an academic appointment during the 1983-84 
academic year, in each of the three unionized 4-year institutions in 
Oregon's system of higher education. 
(2) Decision-Making Process/Bodies important to faculty members' 
governance and function within the academy were studied by questions 12 
through 16 of the research instrument. 
To statement 14, "The faculty senate/council has become less 
effective as governance bodies," and 16, "There was a reduced sense of 
collegiality among faculty," the investigator found respondents in each 
of the three unionized 4-year institutions agreed that these were 
significant contextual factors in their decision to vote for a contract 
renewal. As demonstrated in Table XXVI, 30 of the 70 Western Oregon 
TABLE XXV 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 
8 AND 11 OF TIlE RESEARCH INSTRUHENT BY 
THE EMPLOYING ACADEHIC SETTING 
Frequency 
Institutional Influencea Strongly 
Employing Academic Agree Agree Undecided Dlasgree 
Settings !! ('1.) !! ('1.) !! (1.) !! (7.) 
6. State leglalative 
funding was reduced 
for your institution 
WOSC 11 05.3'1.) 33 (45.6'1.) 6 01.1'1.) 17 (23.6'1.) 
SOSC 42 (46.7'1.) 31 (34 .4'1.) 4 (4.4'1.) 2 (2.2'1.) 
PSU 104 (39.9'1.) 104 (39.9'1.) 16 (6.9'1.) 21 (8.l'1.) 
11. Limited institu-
tional funds have 
decreased the devel-
opment of academic 
programs. 
WOSC 12 06.7'1.) 34 (47.2'1.) 9 (12.5'1.) 14 (19.4'1.) 
sose 28 (31.1'1.) 41 (45.6'1.) 9 00.0'1.) 2 (2.2'1.) 
PSU 85 (32.6'1.) 102 (39.1'1.) 29 (11.1'1.) 32 (12.3'1.) 
Strongly 
Dlasgree 
N (7.) 
3 (44.2'1.) 
02.2'1.) 
14 (5.4'1.) 
3 (4.2'1.) 
10 (11.1'1.) 
13 (5.0'1.) 
Totsl 
Population 
72 
90 
261 
72 
90 
261 
co 
N 
83 
State College respondents, 26 of the 90 Southern Oregon State College 
respondents, and 93 of Portland State University's 260 respondents 
agreed with statement 14. In response to statement 16, the investigator 
found that 24 of the 70 Western Oregon State College respondents, 33 of 
the 90 Southern Oregon State College respondents and 91 of the Portland 
State University 260 respondents recorded agreement with the statement. 
Statements 13 and 15 of the research instrument focused on the 
Unpact of the decision-making process, as related to the development of 
educational policy for the institutions at the state and departmental 
level of governance. 
To statement 13, (See Table XXVII) "The educational policy 
decision-making rights of the central administration were controlled by 
the state education agency," 82 of Portland State University's total 259 
respondents recorded agreement with the statement, as did 23 of the 
respondents from Southern Oregon State College. At Western Oregon State 
College only 19 of the 70 respondents agreed with the statement, while 
28 or 34.3% disagreed that this statement was a significant contextual 
factor in their decision to vote for a new institutional academic 
collective bargaining contract. 
As illustrated in Table XXVII, 82 of the 261 Portland State 
University respondents answered in agreement with statement 15; "There 
was a decline in the faculty members' influence in policy-making at the 
departmental level," while 80 respondents disagreed that the statement 
was a significant factor in their collective bargaining voting. 
Twenty-eight or 40.0% of the Western Oregon State College faculty 
TAULt: XXVI 
IllSTR16UTION OF Rt:SPONllt:NTS ACCORDING TO QUESTIONS 
14 AND 16 OF TilE Rt:SEARCII INSTRUMENT BY 
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION 
Frequt!ncy 
lnslilulional Intluence~ Strongly 
Employ 1IIg Acctdcmic Agree! Agrt!t! Undecided Disagree 
Settings N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) 
14. The faculty academic 
6cnate! council has 
become less effective 
a~ a governance body. 
wose 6 (8.67.) ]0 (42.9%) 9 (12.97.) 19 (27.17.) 
sose 20 (22.27.) 26 (28.97.) II <12.27.) 21 (2].37.) 
PSU J3 (12.67.) 93 (35.67.) 56 (21.57.) 62 (23.87.) 
16. Then: was a reduced 
.~n"e of coll~8lallty 
among the faculty. 
wose 10 (13.97.) 24 (33.37.) 10 <13.9%) 21 (29.27.) 
sose 13 (14.47.) 33 (36.77.) 15 (16.77.) 16 (17.87.) 
PSU 49 (18.97.) 91 (35.07.) 36 <13.97.) 62 (23.97.) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (7.) 
6 (8.67.) 
12 (13.37.) 
17 (6.57.) 
(9.rt.) 
13 <14.47.) 
22 (18.57.) 
Totai 
Population 
70 
90 
261 
72 
90 
260 
OJ 
P. 
Intililutiollal Influences 
EmployinB Academic 
Settings 
U. 'fhe L-ducaliona I pol-
Icy dec Is ion-mak lng 
rights of the insti-
tution's central ad-
ministration were 
conlroll~d by lh~ 
utale educational 
agency. 
lIose 
sose 
PSU 
IS. Tllcre was a decline 
In tht! faculty mem-
berH' inC luenccs on 
policy decislon-
making at tllc de-
partmental lev~l. 
1I0se 
sose 
PSU 
TABLE XXV II 
DISTRIBUTION OF ."ACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS 
U !.Nil IS OF TilE RESEARC/I INSTRUMENT BY 
EMPLOYING ACAllEMle INSTITUTION 
frcqut!llcy 
Strongly 
Agree Agrec Undecided Olsijgrce 
N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) 
4 (5.77.) 19 (27.1·4) 14 (20.27.) 28 (34.37.) 
12 (13.37.) 2] (25.07.) 22 (24.47.) 22 (24.4·4) 
]2 (12.47.) 82 (] 1. 77.) 02 (2].9·4) 01 (23.07.) 
12 (17.17.) 28 (40.07.) (4.37.) 20 (26.07.) 
10 (11.17.) 17 (I8.97.) IS (Io.14) 28 (] 1. 17.) 
49 (16.87.., 62 (] 1.47.) 23 (8.87.) 80 (30.14) 
Strong 1 y 
Disagree 
~ (7.) 
12 (12.97.) 
II (12.17.) 
22 (8.57.) 
( 10.07.) 
20 (22.27.) 
27 (10.]7.) 
Tolal 
Population 
70 
90 
259 
70 
90 
201 
(Xl 
U1 
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recorded agreement with the statement, while 28 or 31.1% of the Southern 
Oregon State College respondents disagreed that the statement was of 
significance to their institution. 
(3) Organizational changes -- statement(s) 10, 18 and 19 of the 
research instrument address those factors in the organizational 
structures and functions that can influence a faculty member to vote in 
support of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance 
mode for an institution. Specific data analysis of the questions reveals 
the following: 
(A) A substantive number of the institutional respondent subsample 
groups disagree with statement 10, "The structural size of the 
institution has grown rapidly during the preceding five 
years." As shown in Table XXVIII, 42 of the 68 Western Oregon 
State College respondents, 60 of the Southern Oregon State 
College 86 total respondents, as well as 149 of the 215 
Portland State University respondents recorded a disagreement 
with the statement. 
(B) About half of the Portland State University respondents 
recorded disagreement with statements 18 and 19 (See Table 
XXVIII). However, statement 18, "The institution has developed 
and implemented a new mission and goal statement," was a 
significant contextual factor to respondents at Western Oregon 
State College where 34 of the 71 respondents were in agreement 
that a new mission and goal statement(s) had been developed 
and implemented in their university system. 
Instltutlonal luf lucnceu 
imploylug Academ1C 
Settings 
10. TIIC slructural size 
01 lhe instituti.on 
has grown rapidly 
durillg the preceding 
f !tica 1 year. 
\lOse 
SOSC 
PSU 
18. The institution has 
developed and imple-
mented new mh&ion and 
goa 1 staLements. 
\lOSC 
sose 
PSU 
19. The institution hss de-
ulgncd and implemented 
a n~w organizational 
structure. 
\lose 
sose 
PSII 
TAULE XXV III 
DISTRIUUTlON or FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS 
10, IH, AND 19 OF TilE RESEARCII INSTRUHENT 
BY EHI'LOY ING ACADEH1C INSTITUTION 
rrcquem:y 
Slrongly 
Agl'"ee Agree Undecided Ditiagrec 
N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) N (%) 
(2.9'k) 9 (19.I·k) 16 (13.27.) 26 (36.27.) 
6 <7.0%) II ((2.8%) 9 (10.57.) 31 (36.17.) 
8 (3.17.) 38 (14.77.) 63 (24.47.) 95 (36.87.) 
4 (5.67.) 30 (42.37.) 12 (16.97.) 19 (26.87.) 
4 (4.57.) 2] (25.87.) 26 (29.27.) 18 (20.2'1.) 
4 ( 1.57.) 43 (16.67.) 74 (28.67.) 98 ()7.8·k) 
9 (12.97.) ]9 (55.77.) 6 (8.6·k) J) (18.57.) 
<7.97.) 26 (29.27.) 22 (24.77.) 17 (19.17.) 
9 (3.57.) 60 (23.2'1.) 74 (28.6·k) 81 01.37.) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
~ (7.) 
16 (26.57.) 
29 (33. 77.) 
54 (20.97.) 
6 (8.57.) 
18 (20.27.) 
40 (15.47.) 
(4.37.) 
17 (19. II.) 
35 (13.57.) 
Total 
Popul allon 
68 
86 
258 
71 
89 
259 
70 
H9 
259 
co 
..... 
88 
Furthermore, statement 19, "The institution has designed 
and implemented a new organizational structure," was 
identified as an influencing factor for 70 faculty members at 
Western Oregon State College, where 48 or 68.6% of the 
respondents recorded agreement with the statement. In 
addition, 33 of the total 89 respondents at Southern Oregon 
State College agreed that their decision to vote for contract 
renewal had been influenced by a new institutional 
organizational design and structure. However, 34 of the 
institution's respondents were in disagreement with the 
statement. 
D.' Students 
Statements 7 and 17 on the questionnaire are specific to student 
issues, which could be perceived as influencing factors in a faculty 
member's decision to support academic collective bargaining. 
While only 45 of 421 respondents agreed with statement 17, "Student 
power has increased on the campus," a decline in student enrollment was 
identified as an influencing factor by 40 or 55.5% of the total 72 
respondents (See Table XXIX) from Western Oregon State College in their 
decision to vote for a renewal of the institutional bargaining 
contract. 
Institutional Governance Information 
Introduction 
Academic institutional governance was the third area of inquiry for 
TABLE XXIX 
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY RESPONSES TO QU~STIONS SEVEN 
AND SEVENTEEN OF TIlE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 8¥ 
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION 
Frequency 
Intil ilut 10na1 lnf lucnces Slrongly 
Employing Acaucmic Agree Agree Undecided Disagree 
Settings N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) N (7.) 
7. Tilt! ln~llLu['on was 
expel lcnclng a de-
cline in sLudent 
enrol hnent. 
IIOSC 8 (11.17.) 32 (44.47.) 4 (5.67.) 16 (22.27.) 
SOSC (2.37.) 10 (11.47.) 15 (17.17.) 30 (]4.1;.) 
PSU 16 (].27.) 67 (25.97.) 47 (18.27.) 86 (]3.27.) 
17. Student power haa 
lncrca~ed on the 
campus. 
IIOSC (2.87.) (9.97.) 13 (18.37.) 32 (45.17.) 
SOSC 0 (0.0"1.) 17 (J8.97.) ( 7.8%) 41 (45.67.) 
PSU 0 (0.07.) 19 ( 7.37.) 50 (19.77.) 125 (48.1;.) 
Slrongly 
Disagree 
N (7.) 
12 (16.77.) 
31 (]5.27.) 
43 (16.67.) 
17 (23.97.) 
25 (27.8%) 
66 (25.97.) 
TOlal 
Population 
72 
88 
259 
71 
90 
260 
ex> 
'" 
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this study. This process includes both the formal decision-making 
structures used within a university system, which have the potential to 
affect relationships, procedures and policies. 
Four sub-sets of data are presented. (1) professional interests, 
(2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/ 
personnel policies specific to academic governance issues. 
Professional Interests 
The first subset of data specific to academic governance includes 
respondents'. reported perceptions to the impact that academic collective 
bargaining had upon their professional prestige within the employing 
institution. 
As shown in Table XXX (See Appendix J), the research instrument 
studied eight professional interest statements. As the data reveals, 
respondents were in disagreement or strong disagreement with seven 
statements (20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27) of the survey. In brief, the 
data suggest respondents do not agree that academic collective 
bargaining has provided them with: 
(1) An academic milieu supportive of the pursuit of scholarship. 
(2) A collegial relationship with administration. 
(3) A professional, rather than employee, status to their role in 
the institution. 
(4) An increased interest in the function and role of the faculty 
senate/council. 
(5) Involvement in the selection process for the appointment of an 
administrator to a central or departmental administration 
91 
position. 
(6) An influence in setting institutional standards for academic 
performance. 
(7) The right to participate in policy-making on educational 
issues that have the potential to affect public opinion about 
the institution. 
However, to statement No. 22 (See Table XXXI), 226 of the 474 
respondents agreed that academic collective bargaining has provided them 
with "a formalized structure and process for institutional 
decision-making" in their employing university system. 
Economic Interests 
The second subset of data specific to academic governance is 
respondents' reported perception to academic collective bargaining as a 
facilitator for institutional economic interests. 
As illustrated in Table XXXII (see Appendix K), the data suggest 
that, as an aggregate, the respondents do not agree academic collective 
bargaining has: (1) provided the faculty with a higher public profile 
specific to budgetary issues in Oregon's system of higher education, 
(2) encouraged the university budgetary affairs committee to link budget 
planning to institutional academic goals, (3) provi~ed for faculty input 
into the long-range budgeting planning modes of the institution, or 
(4) generated additional money for the faculty salary scale in Oregon's 
system of higher education. 
However, additional analysis of the data (See Table XXXIII) 
Institutional Governance Information 
Employing Academic Selling 
22. A formalized structure and 
process for institulional 
deFlalon-maklng 
IIOSC 
sose 
PSU 
Total Responst!s 
TABLE XXXI 
t'ACULTY HEMB~RS' PERCEPTIONS ot' TilE IMPACT OF 
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE! PROCESS 
Strongly 
Agree 
N ('4) 
Agree 
N (7.) 
Frequency 
Unde-
cided 
N (7.) 
15 ([9.27.) 32 (41.07.) 6 0,77.) 
8 (B.3?) 36 (31.57.) 12 (12.57.) 
29 (9.1%) lOb (35.37.) 60 (20.07.) 
~ 1~ ro 
Dis-
agree 
N (7.) 
]1 (26.9%) 
24 (25.07,) 
14 (24.17.) 
119 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (7.) 
4 (5. I',) 
16 (16. n.) 
]1 (10.)7.) 
51 
TOlal 
Respondents 
78 
96 
)00 
414 
\0 
N 
Institution 
Southern 
Oregon Slate 
College 
Portland 
State 
University 
Weslern 
Oregon Slale 
College 
TABLE XXX III 
RESPONIJENTS 0 I'ERCEI'T10NS TO STATEMENTS 
(29. 30. 31. 34 OR 36) ECONOMIC 
INTEREST IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 
Economic Interest 
Statement 
29. Clarify the problem 
3~. 
of a low faculty salary 
schedule in Oregonls 
system Qf higher edu-
cation. 
Increased the importance 
of budgetary/financial 
affairs conmiLtec's role 
in university budH,et an-
aly.l. and planning. 
31. Strengthen your input 
InlO ahort-range univer-
sity budget planning and 
decision-making. 
34. Assisted the faculty and 
administration [0 prescnt 
a uni tcd agreement to the 
state legislature. 
29. Clarify the problem 
of a low faculty salary 
schedule in Oregon' B 
Bystem of higher edu-
calion. 
30. IncrcaBed the imporlance 
of budgetary/financial 
affairs corrrnillec's role 
In university hudget an-
alYSis and planning. 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (7.) 
9 (9.37.) 
4 (4.17.) 
4 (4.27.) 
7 (7.37..) 
32 (10.77.) 
3 (6.37.) 
AgI"CC 
N (7.) 
44 (45.47.) 
39 (39.87.) 
3D ()9.67.) 
3 I 02.07.) 
105 (35.27.) 
31 <25.37.) 
F.-cquency 
Unde-
cided 
!! (7.) 
10 (10.37.) 
26 (26.57.) 
19 (19.87.) 
28 (28.97.) 
42 (14.17..) 
10 (8.97.) 
Dis-
agr-ce 
N (7.) 
16 (\b.57.) 
19 (19.47..) 
22 (22.97.) 
17 (17.57.) 
92 ()0.97.) 
26 (34.27.) 
Strongly 
DilSsgn:c 
N 7. 
18 (18.67.) 
10 (1D.27.) 
13 (13.57.) 
14 (14.47.) 
27 (9.17.) 
9 (25.37.) 
Total 
Respondents 
97 
98 
98 
97 
298 
79 
..0 
W 
suggests that the academic collective bargaining process, for many 
Southern Oregon College respondents, is perceived as having 
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(1) clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's 
system of higher education, (2) increased the importance of the 
budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget 
analysis and planning, (3) assisted the faculty and administration to 
present a united agreement to the state legislature, and (4) increased 
their salary and fringe benefits for the system. 
Furthermore, this analysis reveals that while 137 of the 298 
Portland State University respondents agree with statement 29 of the 
research instrument, which states that "collective bargaining clarified 
the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of 
higher education," 119 respondents disagreed with the statement. 
In addition, 35 of the 79 Western Oregon State College respondents 
agree that the collective bargaining process has provided an "increase 
in the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's role 
in university budget analysis and planning." However, 35 of the 79 
respondents disagreed with the statement. 
Educational Policies 
The academic community has established a tradition to assure the 
academician's rights for active participation in determining the 
educational policies of a university system, as well as establishing 
those institutional procedures that govern the educational process: 
(1) teaching, (2) programs, or (3) students (Sands, 1971). This right 
for the academician may be further supported in the university setting 
95 
by the acceptance of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance 
. 
mode. 
In Oregon, data (See Table XXXIV) of this study suggest faculty 
respondents do not agree that it has been necessary to implement 
academic collective bargaining in order to assure the faculty members' 
right to determine educational policies and procedures in their 
institutions. Their perceptions are further supported by the following 
select respondents' comments: (1) "Collective Bargaining has had no 
effect here. Faculty participation remains the same," (2) "No effect," 
3) "Collective Bargaining is only one factor, and a minor one," (4) "No 
difference now than before collective bargaining," (5) ''We never have a 
problem in this area," (6) "To a large extent, these were already in 
place." 
Academic and Personnel Policies 
University educators have the primary governance authority for all 
matters related to faculty status (AAUP, 1984). This study 
investigated collective bargaining's impact in providing the 
opportunity for faculty members employed in Oregon's unionized 
institutions to participate in determining policies related to: 
(1) academic duties, (2) academic standards and personnel policies, and 
(3) support services. For this data subset, the respondents were 
requested to record their responses on a four-part scale: (1) always, 
(2) frequently, (3) infrequently, and (4) never. 
As shown in Table XXXV, the responses to items 44, 45, and 46 of 
the research instrument indicate that the acceptance of collective 
TABLE XXXIV 
fACUI.H MEMIIERS' PERCEPTION Uf TIlE IMPACT OF ACADEMIC 
COLI.ECT! VE BARGAINING UN EDUCATIONAl. POLICY 
DETERMINANTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Frequency 
Strongly Undc- DI.-
Institutional Grievance Agree Agree clded agree 
Educational Policies N (1.) N (1.) N (1.) !! (l) 
37. Academic Standards (0.21.) 22 (4.67.) 8S (18.51.) 244 (51.n) 
38. Curriculum Content 3 (0.6l) 39 (6.37.) 84 (( 7.77.) 226 (47.67.) 
39. Degree Requirements (o.n) )4 (J.n) 91 ((9.71) 229 (46.2l) 
40. Grading Standards (o.n) 26 (5.57.) 94 (19.8l) 228 (48.0l) 
41. Slandards for Student Conduct and (0.27.) 24 (5.07.) 102 (21.47.) 229 (48.17.) 
Discipline 
42. Types of Degrees Offered (o.n) 26 (5.57.) 87 (16.4l) 229 (48.47.) 
43. Establishment of Educational Programs 3 (O.6l) )) (J .07.) 105 (22.n) 215 (45.47.) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
!! (l) 
121 (25.47.) 
123 (25.97.) 
120 (25.37.) 
126 (26.57.) 
120 (25.27.) 
130 (27.57.) 
116 (24.9l) 
Total 
Respondent8 
476 
475 
475 
475 
476 
473 
474 
'-D 
(J\ 
TABLE XXXV 
FACUl.TY RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING'S IMPACT ON ACADEMIC AND PERSONNEL 
I'OLICIES IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Frequency 
TaLa} 
In~tltutional Governance Academic Always Frequenlly Infrequently Never Fr-equency 
and Personnel Policies N (7.) N (7.) !! (7.) !! 7. 
Academic Dutlea 
44. Teaching AS81gnment 41 (9.2"k) 80 (18.07.) 132 (29.77.) 191 (43.07.) 444 
45. Teaching Schedules 34 (7.77.) 83 (18.77.) 127 (28.67.) 200 (45.17.) 444 
46. Teaching Loada 29 (6.67.) 76 (17.27.) 151 04.lt) 187 (42.27.) 443 
Academic Standards/Practices Policies for 
47. Faculty Recruiunent 31 (7.17.) 78 (17.87.) 148 (33.71) 182 (;1.51) 439 
48. Faculty Promotion 55 (12.47.) 135 00.57.) 133 (20.01) 120 (27.17.) 443 
49. Faculty Tenure 65 (14.5t) 137 (J0.57.) 133 (29.67.) iii. (25.47.) 449 
50. Academic freedao 64 (14.57.) 144 02.57.) 123 (27.87.) 112 (25.37.) 443 
*51. Dismissal for Cauae 74 (17.07.) 155 (35.67.) 123 (28.27.) B4 ((9.37.) 436 
52. Salary Scale 42 (9.37.) 121 (26.87.) 151 03.47.) 138 (l0.57.) 452 
53. Fringe Benefits 49 (ll.07.) 135 00.27.) 152 04.07.) III (24.87.) 447 
*54. Grievance Procedures 125 (27.B7.) IBO (40.07.) 95 (21.17.) 50 (11.17.) 450 
Support Services 
55. Office Space 12 (2.77.) 32 0.27.) 127 (2B.77.) 271 (61.37.) 442 
56. Secretarial Help 10 (2.37.) 29 (6.67.) 127 (2B.77.) 276 (62.47.) 442 
\0 
-.I 
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bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the respondents' 
university system has not affected the faculty's opportunity to 
participate in the academic issues related to teaching: (1) assignment, 
(2) schedule, and (3) load. As respondents' corrments suggest: (1) "Our 
collective bargaining has done very little that was not already being 
done. I believe that I have input into many academic and administrative 
decisions, but I had this without collective bargaining;" (2) "We had 
all of these prior to collective bargaining in my department;" 
(3) "These do not relate to collective bargaining on our campus, in my 
opinion;" and (4) "We do all of these, but not because of collective 
bargaining." 
Academic standards and personnel policy issues were investigated by 
items 47,48,49,50,51,52,53, and 54 (See Table XXXV). From the 
faculty respondents' perceptions, the Unplementation of collective 
bargaining has provided the opportunity for faculty to make policy 
decisions related to the issues of: (1) dismissal for cause, and 
(2) grievance procedures. However, respondents do not tend to perceive 
collective bargaining as providing the faculty members with an 
opportunity to determine departmental personnel policies related to 
"support or secretarial services." 
Data Analysis Specific to The 
Four Dependent Variable Subsets 
This section of Chapter IV was developed to present an analysis of 
the interaction(s) between select demographic data from Part I -
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Respondent Information and data specific to the four dependent variable 
sets of the study: (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, 
(3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies. 
Sum Scores for the Dependent Variable Sets 
From the survey data, the population values for the sum scores 
specific for the various sections of the research instrument are shown 
in Table XXXVI. This statistical information allows the investigator to 
characterize the respondents' total responses to each of the summed 
dependent variables. Furthermore the Cronbach's Alpha, a measure of 
internal consistency, was computed for four sections of the 
questionnaire. Coefficients at .90, .89, .96, and .93 were obtained for 
the sections on professional interests, economic interests, educational 
policies and academic/personnel policies. The high alpha values 
obtained indicated individuals tended to answer questions within each 
section consistently and supported the use of summed scores in 
subsequent analysis. 
TABLE XXXVI 
POPULATION VALUES FOR THE SUM SCORE 
Variable N Mean StDev (.95 cn median min max 
Professional Interest Issues 458 3.45 .882 (3.367,3.532) 3.50 1.13 5.00 
Economic Interest Issues 459 3.36 .812 (3.284,3.436) 3.44 1.00 5.00 
Educational Policy Issues 469 3.94 .764 (3.869,4.011) 4.00 2.00 5.00 
Academic/Personnel Interest Issues 410 2.81 .741 (2.737,2.883) 2.82 1.00 4.00 
The total respondents' sum-scores (see Table XXVII) for the two 
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dependent variable sets, professional and economic interests, can be 
characterized as undecided/disagree. The respondents are best described 
as in disagreement with the dependent variable concerned with 
educational policies. The fourth dependent variable of the study, 
academic/personnel policies, is characterized by the data as 
infrequent. 
TABLE XXXVII 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE SUB-SETS ACCORDING 
TO SUM-SCORES 
Dependent 
Variable Sub-Set 
Median Characteristics 
Questions Sum-Score of Responses 
Professional Interests 20-27 3.50 Undecided/Disagree 
Economic Int~rests 28-36 3.44 Undecided/Disagree 
Educa tional Policie9 37-43 4.00 Di9agree 
Academic/Personnel Pol1c ies 44-56 2.82 Infrequen t 1 y 
These sum variables, (1) professional interests, (2) economic 
interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/ personnel 
policies form the four hypotheses. Therefore, the sum-scores for each 
variable were further examined to statistically answer the research 
question, "Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental 
governance mode by three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher 
education been supportive of the faculty members' rights for 
participation in institutional governance?" 
Hypothesis Testing 
In order to answer the research question, the four hypotheses of 
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the study were tested. The sum scores for the dependent variable set 
were studied using nine independent variables: (1) the number of 
teaching years in a 4-year institution of higher education, (2) AAUP 
membership, (3) salary, (4) governance, (5) age, (6) involvement in the 
institution's bargaining process, (7) academic rank, (8) institution of 
employment, and (9) departmental assignment. More precisely, the 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was used to identify 
those sub-groups of the respondents whose answers generated 
significantly different sum scores. 
Two of the independent variables, academic rank and the number of 
full-time teaching years in a 4-year institution of higher education, 
generated no significant statistical differences for any of the sum 
variables. However, seven of. the nine independent variables tested, 
(see Table XXXVIII) at the 0.05 level, generated a statistically 
significant difference for the summed dependent variables. 
Independent 
Variables 
AAUP Membersh ip 
Salary 
Governance Bodies 
Age 
Institutional In-
volvement With 
Bargaining 
Institution 
Department 
"NS":p > 0.05 
TABLE XXXVIII 
KRUSKAL-WALLIS STATISTIC P-VALUES 
FOR THE VARIABLES 
Summed Dependent Variable Set 
Professional Economic Educational Academic/Personnel 
Interests Interests Policies Policies 
(H:l) (H:2) (H:)) (H:4) 
.0001 .0001 NS NS 
.0001 .0002 .0004 .0008 
NS NS .005 NS 
NS NS NS .03 
.0001 .0001 .00) .0001 
.005 .007 NS .0002 
NS .03 .03 NS 
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Hypothesis One (H:l) 
To further explore H:l, the collective bargaining process has 
affirmed the professional interests of the academician with an 
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, 
subgroup means were computed. 
As a result of the one-way analysis of variance testing, no 
significant statistical differences were found between the independent 
variables, age, governance committee membership, or departmental 
assignment and the sum data for the dependent variable, professional 
interests. However, as illustrated in Table XXXIX, the sum variables 
and the demographic variables, AAUP membership, employing institution, 
salary and involvement in bargaining, exhibited statistically 
significant differences. 
TABU XXXU 
stlllLTIJIEOUS COtIPAIllSOIIS or SUB-ClOUP HUJlS POl 1ACULn 
USPOIIDtIITS' naCEnIOIIS or AC.\])DIIC COLUCTIVI 
!.U.CAI"IIIO AlII) nonsSIOIIAI. llITEUST ISSIIES 
(2) EaploJin, InoUtutlon 
(.) Wlltom Or.,on SUto coUo" 
(b) Sou thorn Or.,on IUto CoUo,o 
(c) Portland SUte Unhoroit,. 
(3) Solar,. for 9 .... Controct 
(a) $10,000-$25,000 
(b) $26,000-$30,000 
(c) avor $30 ,000 
c.) Ko Involv .. _nt 
(b) Sa,htl,. .... th. 
(e) AcUvo 
(d) Ver,. AcUvo 
• 
136 
305 
73 
93 
292 
140 
162 
152 
2114 
106 
40 
27 
Aotl: + - 0.6$ hv.l, ... 0.005. * _ 0.001 ..... 0.0001 
3.ll++ 
3.43. 
3.53++ 
3.23· 
3.39. 
3.70*,+ 
3.67-
3.20- ,. 
3.01-
2.69- ,+ 
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As previously indicated, the respondents' answers related to the 
sum variable, professional interests, were clearly skewed to the right 
side of the research instrument's 5-point Likert Scale, used by the 
faculty members to record their responses to each question: 
(1) AAUP Membership - The respondents who are members of the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) appear to be rather 
undecided about whether or not academic collective bargaining has 
provided support for their professional interests, whereas the 
respondents who are not members of the AAUP seem closer to disagreement 
that collective bargaining has provided such support. Although the AAUP 
nonmembers' mean score is 3.55, their responses are significantly closer 
to the "disagree" category on the 5-point Likert scale, Wilcoxon z = 
3.88, p = .0001. 
(2) Employing Institution - The average scores range from 3.13 to 
3.53 for the respondents employed by the three subject unionized 
institutions. These respondents reported scores are between the 
"undecided" and "disagree" categories on the Likert scale. Respondents 
employed by Western Oregon State College appear statistically to be more 
undecided about the effects of the bargaining process in providing for 
their professional interests than is the faculty group from Southern 
Oregon State College and Portland State University. These latter 
groups' perception of the process, as the mean score shows, is 
statistically closer to disagreeing that the process has provided for 
their professional interests within the employing university system. 
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(3) Salary - The mean scores for faculty respondents who have a 
salary within the $10,000 - $25,000 range, as well as the $26,000 -
$30,000 salary range, suggest that these groups lean significantly more 
toward being "undecided" about the association between the collective 
bargaining process and their professional interest rights as an 
academician, than does the group reporting salaries over $30,000 for a 9 
month academic year (Q 3.3, p < 0.005, Table B.14 in Zar, p. 568). 
(4) Involvement In The Process - Faculty members reporting no 
involvement in the collective bargaining process perceptions are 
significantly closer to "disagreeing" th~t the process has been a 
facilitator of their professional interests in the employing university 
setting, than do respondents reporting involvement in the process. 
Hypothesis Two (H:2) 
To further study if the collective bargaining as implemented in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education has provided for the 
academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process 
related to the economic interests of the institution, simultaneous 
comparisons of sub-group means were computed using the previously stated 
nine independent variable and the sum-variable economic interests. 
As a result of the additional testing, a statistically significant 
relationship was identified (See Table XL) between the faculty 
respondents' perceptions of academic collective bargaining as providing 
for the institution's economic interests and five of the demographic 
variables: (1) departmental appointment, (2) AAUP membership, 
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(3) employing institution, (4) involvement in the institutional 
bargaining process, and (5) salary. No statistical association was 
shown between this sum-variable and the independent variables of age and 
membership in university or departmental governance committees. 
TABLE XL 
SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY 
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC INTEREST ISSUES 
Economic Interests 
Independent Variables N Average Scores 
(1) Departmental Assignment 
(a) Liberal ArtslSciences 267 3.29* 
(b) Professional Schools 156 3.48* 
(c) Others 32 3.41 
(2) AAUP Membership 
(a) Yes 132 3.11+++ 
(b) No 310 3.46+++ 
(3) Employing Institution 
(a) Western Oregon State College 75 3.53*,+ 
(b) Southern Oregon State College 96 3.18+,* 
(c) Portland State University 288 3.37* 
(4) Involvement in the Bargaining Process 
(a) No Involvement 285 3.51* .** ,++ 
(b) Slightly Active 108 3.18++ 
(c) Active 37 3.12 .... ,* 
(d) Very Active 28 2.88** 
(5 ) Salary 
(a) $10,000-$25,000 137 3.20++ 
(b) $26,000-$30,000 168 3.29+ 
(c) Over $30,000 150 3.57+ I ++ 
*: 0.05, +: 0.01, **: 0.002, ...... : 0.001, +++: 0.0001 
(1) Departmental Appointment - A statistically significant 
difference was found at the p < O.05level between the departmental 
appointments of the Liberal Arts/Sciences and the Professional Schools 
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relative to the dependent variable "economic interests." Respondents 
with an appointment in a professional school disagree more about 
academic collective bargaining as a supplemental mode that has provided 
for the participation in these processes related to the institution's 
economic interests. While respondents in the third departmental 
sub-group "others" had no significant statistical relationship 
identified, their mean score of 3.41, like the other departmental 
groups, fell between the "undecided" and "disagree" categories on the 
Likert Scale. 
(2) AAUP Membership - For both the respondent groups selecting/not 
selecting membership in the (AAUP) American Association of University 
Professors, a statistically significant assessment was found at the 
.0001 level. Although faculty members with membership seem to be 
"undecided" about the role that the bargaining process has provided for 
the nonmembers' participation in the institution's "economic interests," 
their mean-score of 3.55 is closer to the "disagree" category on the 
scale Wilcoxon Z = 4.20, p < .0001. 
(3) Employing Institution - Faculty respondents at all three 
institutions seem to lie on the "disagree" side of the "undecided" 
category about academic collective bargaining as a supplemental 
governance mode that has provided for the participation in those 
processes specific to "economic interests." The findings indicate that 
the respondents from Western Oregon State College and Portland State 
University lean more toward the "disagree" category on the scale than do 
the respondents employed at Southern Oregon State College. 
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(4) Involvement in Bargaining - The IIno involvement" respondents 
appear to perceive the process in relationship to their participation in 
the issues related to the institution's "economic interests" nearer to 
the IIdisagree" category on the S-point scale, with a mean score of 3.S 1, 
than do respondents indicating very active involvement. 
(S) Salary - All three groups of faculty respondents, according to 
their salary range for the academic year, are "undecided" to "disagree" 
about the collective bargaining process as a facilitator for the 
lIeconomic interests" of their university system. The respondents with 
an academic year income over $30,000 are significantly closer to the 
"disagree" category than the two groups of respondents earning less for 
an academic year appointment. 
Hypothesis Three (H:3) 
As reported earlier in the chapter, the frequency distribution of 
the respondent answers to questions 37-43 of the research instrument 
seems to indicate faculty members IIdisagree" that collective bargaining 
has been necessary to provide for the opportunity to determine 
educational policies related to seven academic issues: (1) academic 
standards, (2) curricular content, (3) degree requirements, (4) grading 
standards, (S) standards for student conduct/discipline, (6) type of 
degrees offered, and (7) the establishment of educational programs. 
This position is further supported by thp. reported respondents' 
comments. 
However, from the statistical information provided by the analysis 
of subgroup means, (See Table XLI) a significant difference can be 
reported between the educators' perception of academic collective 
bargaining as providing an opportunity to determine institutional 
educational policy and the respondents' (1) membership on a 
university/departmental governance committee, (2) departmental 
assignment, (3) salary, and (4) amount of involvement with the 
bargaining process. 
TABLE XLI 
SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY 
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND EDUCATIONAL INTEREST ISSUES 
Educational lnterests 
Independent Variables N Average Scores 
0) Governance Bodies 
(a) Faculty Academic Senate 74 4.09** 
(b) Finance 12 4.12 
(c) Rank & Tenure 64 3.68** 
(d) Others 99 3.93 
(2) Departmental Assignment 
(a) Liberal Arts/Sciences 278 3.90* 
(b) Professional Schools 156 3.96 
(c) Others 31 4.21* 
(3) Salary 
(a) $10,000-$25,000 141 3.80++ 
(b) $26,000-$30,000 168 3.88+ 
(cl Over $30,000 157 4.12+,++ 
(4) Involvement in the Bargaining Process 
(a) No Involvement 289 4.04+ 
(b) Slightly Active 110 3.77+ 
(c) Active 41 3.70 
(d) Very Active 28 3.90 
Note: *: 0.05; .: .02; **: 0.05, ++: 0.001 
(1) Membership on Governance Committee - as shown in Table XLI, 
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significant difference at the p < .005 level was found between those 
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respondents reporting membership in the Faculty Academic Senate and the 
Rank and Tenure Committee. While the respondents who hold membership on 
a Faculty Academic Senate appear to disagree that bargaining has 
provided them with the opportunity to participate in the institution's 
educational policy decisions, members of Rank and Tenure Committee 
scores lie significantly closer to the "undecided" category on the 
Likert Scale (Q = 3.38). 
(2) Departmental Assignment - In the subject institutions, faculty 
respondents with an appointment in a Liberal Arts/Sciences department 
disagreed less about the bargaining process as a positive factor in 
providing for their opportunity to determine educational policy than 
those faculty members with appointments in "other" departments in the 
university system. 
(3) Involvement With Bargaining - A statistical significance of 
p < .02 was found between the sum variable, educational policies, and 
the two classifications of slightly active and no involvement that 
faculty members can select for their involvement in the institution's 
collective bargaining process. The respondents reporting a "no 
involvement" on the Likert Scale produced a mean score indicating more 
disagreement than their colleagues indicating some degree of involvement 
in the institution collective bargaining process. This difference was 
significant only for the "slightly active" group (Q = 3.09). 
(4) Salary - The respondents reporting their academic year salaries 
between $10,000 - $30,000 statistically appear to disagree somewhat (but 
significantly) less about the opportunities that the bargaining process 
has provided for determining the institution's educational policies, 
than the over $30,000 group. 
Hypothesis Four (H:4) 
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To further explore H:4, collective bargaining has provided the 
faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with 
the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel 
policies of their employment, differences in subgroup sum score means 
were analyzed. 
As illustrated in Table XLII, significant statistical differences 
were identified within the independent variables of respondents' 
(1) age, (2) employing institution, (3) involvement in bargaining, and 
(4) salary. 
(1) ~ - The 60 and over respondents appear to perceive a 
statistically significant less frequent opportunity to determine the 
academic/personnel policies of their employment than do those aged 40-49 
years. The other age groups (30-39 years, 50-59 years) fall in between 
these groups and do not statistically differ from either of the 
extremes. Overall, though, even the respondents in the 40-49 year age 
range lean more to the "infrequently" category than to the "frequently." 
option. 
(2) Employing Institution - Faculty respondents' perceptions of 
academic collective bargaining as a process to provide for them the 
opportunity to determine academic policies on the average lie between 
"frequently" and "infrequently" and somewhat closer to the latter 
, 111 
characterization. A statistically significant difference was identified 
TABLE XLII 
SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY 
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AND ACADEMIC/PERSONNEL INTEREST ISSUES 
Academic/Personnel Interests 
Independent Variables N Average Scores 
0) Age 
(a) 30-39 years 27 2.78 
(b) 40-49 years 156 2.70* 
(c) 50-50 years 169 2.84 
(d) 60-over 58 3.02* 
(2) Employing Institution 
(a) Western Oregon State College 68 2.49++ 
(b) Southern Oregon State College 87 2.74 
(c) Portland State University 225 2.92++ 
(3) Involvement in the Bargaining Process 
(a) No Involvement 289 3.00**,++ 
(b) Slightly Active 110 2.65** 
(e) Active 41 2.34++ 
(d) Very Active 28 2.22 ...... 
(4) Salary 
(a) $10,000-$25,000 121 2.63++ 
(b) $26,000-$30,000 147 2.80 
(c) Over $30,000 139 2.97 ...... 
Note: *: .005; **: 0.002; .+: 0.001 
at the p < .001 level for two of the subject institutions, Western 
Oregon State College and Portland State University, and the sum 
variable, academic/personnel policies. While Portland State University 
respondents lean closer to the "infrequently" category of the scale with 
a mean-score of 2.92, (vs. 3.00 for "infrequently") those respondents 
from Western Oregon State College lie almost exactly midway between the 
"frequent" and the "infrequent" categories with a mean-score of 2.49. 
No statistically significant difference was found for the Southern 
Oregon State College respondents. However, their mean-score of 2.74, 
like that of Portland State University respondents, is closer to the 
"infrequent" category. 
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(3) Involvement In Bargaining - Statistically significant 
differences were identified between the amounts of involvement that 
faculty respondents select to have in their institution's bargaining 
process. While there was no significant difference between groups 
indicating at least "slight activity," increased levels of activity 
corresponded to increasing perceptions of "frequent" opportunities to 
determine the academic/personnel policies of their employment (see Table 
XLII). For the respondents selecting "no involvement" in the process, 
however, the process is perceived as "infrequently" providing those 
faculty members employed in their insti~utions with the opportunity to 
determine academic/personnel policies. The differenGe between this 
level of inactivity and all the other levels of activity ("slight to 
very") is statistically significant (p < .002). 
(4) Salary - A significant statistical finding at the p< .001 level 
(See Table XLII) was identified between the two extreme levels of 
respondents' salary range. Those respondents in the salary range of 
over $30,000 seem to perceive that the process has more "infrequently" 
assisted them with the opportunity to determine policy than their 
colleagues with salaries between $10,000-$25,000. However, their 
mean-scores are toward the "infrequent" category on the scale. While no 
significant difference was found for the respondents receiving an 
academic salary of $26,000 - $30,000, their mean-score of 2.80, like 
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those of the other two groups, is c·loser to the "infrequent" category of 
the 4-point scale. 
Chapter V 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter V presents a brief summary of the study, the conclusions 
suggested from the results of the findings, and recommendations for 
further research. 
Summary of the Study 
In the 1960s, the contemporary American university system emerged 
as a powerful societal force, with economic and political influences, as 
well as concentrated resources and a multipurpose capacity (Kerr, 
1963). During this period, faculty members were committed to the 
concept of shared authority as the governance mode for the higher 
education enterprise. However, it was a brief golden age for the 
traditional academic governance mode (Garbarino, 1975). 
The mid-1960s brought a combination of external and internal 
contextual factors to the university system, which impacted upon the 
governance structure and function of the academy (Garbarino, 1975). In 
1966, one consequence of these events was the entry of collective 
bargaining into the university system. It was a process that was not 
intended as an alternative to the traditional governance mode of the 
academy, but rather a supplemental mode to support the advancement of 
faculty governance rights (Polishook, 1982). 
A dynamic social process grounded in the labor movement dating from 
the industrial revolution, academic collective bargaining, amid hostile 
concerns and myths, has made enormous gains as a supplemental governance 
mode in the 4-year private and public institutions of higher education 
(Polishook, 1982). It is a growth that has been assured by a 
well-defined legal environment, which has established laws as the basis 
for federal and state sector employee negotiations (Hedgepeth, 1974). 
Academic collective bargaining, as the mode of governance adopted 
by academicians to impose or reinstate independence into their 
professional lives, has been confirmed by the scholarly works of such 
educational analysts as Aussieker, Garbarino, Baldridge and Lee 
(Schulman, 1979). As Barbara A. Lee wrote in 1979: 
Faculty as a whole gained formal governance powers 
through the union contract. Even on campuses where faculty 
have enjoyed considerable decision-making p'Jwer, the contract 
legitimized and in many cases broadened the scope of faculty 
governance rights (Lee, 1979). 
Therefore, the research question arises: Has the adoption of 
collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education supported faculty 
members' rights for participation in institutional governance? 
The purpose of this survey was to study select faculty members with 
an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of 
higher education to evaluate whether or not they perceiv~ the process of 
collective bargaining as supportive of faculty members' rights to 
participate in institutional governance. To achieve the stated purpose, 
the following problems were investigated: 
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1. Have the professional interests of those academicians with an 
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education 
been affirmed through the collective bargaining process? 
2. Has collective bargaining provided for the academicians' 
participation in financial planning and policy-making related 
to their economic interests as employees of an Oregon 4-year 
institution of higher education? 
3. Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate 
in determining those institutional educational policies related 
to academic issues? 
4. Has the collective bargaining process provided the faculty 
members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education 
with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic 
and personnel policies of their employment? 
The popUlation of the study consisted of 694 faculty members 
holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized 
institutions during the spring of 1984. Those faculty members selected 
for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during 
the academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for 
a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track 
appointment in the department. 
Data for the study were collected from the population using a 56 
item research instrument entitled "A Questionnaire to Study Collective 
Bargaining as a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of 
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in 
Institutional Governance," in three major areas: (1) Respondent 
Information, (2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional 
Governance Information. 
Conclusions of the Study 
Respondent Information 
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From the findings of the study, the results suggest that of those 
respondents holding an appointment in an Oregon 4-year unionized 
institution during the 1983-84 academic year: (1) the largest sub-group 
have taught in a 4-year institution of higher education between 16 and 
20 years; (2) the majority do not hold membership in the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP); (3) a large number elect to 
have no involvement in their institution's collective bargaining 
process; (4) the greatest percentage were in the 40-49 year age range at 
Southern Oregon College and Portland State University, while the 
greatest number at Western Oregon State College reported their ages in 
the 50-59 range; and (5) the salary range of $26,000-$30,000 was 
reported by the majority at Southern Oregon State College and Portland 
State University, with a majority reporting a salary in the 
$21,000-$25,000 range at Western Oregon State College. 
Institutional Influences 
The research data suggest that contextual factors influenced 
respondents in all three subject institutions to vote for a contract 
renewal in 1983. Those contextual factors included (1) funding, 
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(2) decision making processes/bodies, and (3) organizational changes. 
1. Funding At all three institutions, respondents reported 
reduced funding specific to: (a) state legislative funds, and 
(b) Instructional funding required for the development of 
academic programs was perceived as a significant factor in 
their decision to vote. 
(2) Decision-Making -- Processes and decision making bodies related 
to the development of institutional educational policy at the 
state and departmental level of governance were identified as 
significant contextual factors to respondents at Portland State 
University and Southern Oregon State College. Furthermore, the 
data suggest faculty respondents at Portland State University 
and Western Oregon State College perceived a decline in their 
participation in policy-making decisions at a departmental 
level as a significant factor in their collective barga~ning 
vote. 
(3) Organizational Changes -- Two organizational changes: (a) a new 
mission and goal statement, and (b) a new organizational 
structure were perceived by Western Oregon State College 
respondents as a significant factor in their decision to vote 
for the renewal of the institutional bargaining contract. 
HyPotheses of the Study 
For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining 
would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments 
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in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in 
institutional governance. 
The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective 
Bargaining As a Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of 
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in 
Institutional Governance," was used to measure the faculty members' 
perception of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in 
their university system, specific to four dependent variables: 
(1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational 
policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies. 
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was used to 
test each of the four hypotheses of the study: 
H:l The collective bargaining process has affirmed the 
professional interests of the academician with an appointment 
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education. 
H:2 Collective bargaining, as Unplemented in Oregon's 4-year 
institutions of higher education, has provided for the 
academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making 
process related to the economic interests of the institution. 
H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate 
in determining the institution's educational policy on 
academic issues. 
H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in 
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the 
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and 
personnel policies of their employment. 
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Although statistically significant differences were found within 
each dependent variable subset of data, the four hypotheses of the study 
as stated are rejected. However, the results of the study suggest the 
following general conclusions specific to each of the data subsets. 
Professional Interests 
Respondents in the three subject institutions did not appear to 
perceive academic collective bargaining as supportive of their 
"professional interests." However, the data suggest respondents in all 
three subject institutions tend to agree the collective bargaining 
process has provided them with "a formalized structure and process for 
institutional "decision-making." This is "a very important result of 
academic collective bargaining, as identified by the scholarly works of 
Lee, 1979, Nelson, 1982, and Baldridge, 1982. 
Economic Interests 
The aggregate data suggest that the greater number of respondents 
do not agree that academic collective bargaining has provided for their 
participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the 
institution's economic interests. This perception is quite different, 
however, when viewed from the respondents' data as related to specific 
subject institutions. These findings lend this investigator to 
conclude: 
(a) The collective bargaining process is viewed by the majority of 
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respondents at Western Oregon State College as having provided 
an "increase in the importance of the budgetary/financial 
affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and 
planning;" 
(b) A substantial number of respondents at Portland State 
University appear to perceive that the bargaining process has 
"clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in 
Oregon's system of higher education" for their institution; and 
(c) Academic collective bargaining, according to the survey data, 
is perceived by the Southern Oregon State College respondents 
as a supplemental governance mode that has facilitated the 
issue of institutional "economic interests." Data from these 
respondents suggest that the process has: (1) clarified the 
low salary schedules for those faculty respondents in Oregon's 
system of higher education, (2) increased the importance of the 
budgetary/financial affairs committee's roles in their 
university budget analysis and planning, and (3) strengthened 
their input into short-range planning. These respondents also 
identified the process as having: (1) assisted the faculty and 
administration to present a united agreement to the state 
legislature and, more importantly, (2) increased their salary 
and fringe benefits. 
Educational Policies 
Respondents at the three subject institutions do not agree that 
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academic collective bargaining has been/is necessary to provide for 
their rights as a faculty member to determine institutional educational 
policies for the academic issues of: (1) teaching, (2) programs, or 
(3) students. 
Moreover, the respondents of these institutions suggest that these 
rights have been provided by either administrative rules or a faculty 
constitution prior to the adoption of collective bargaining. 
Academic And Personnel Policies 
While the data indicate that collective bargaining has not provided 
the faculty members with opportunities to determine the policies related 
to the academic duties or standards of teaching (1) assignments, 
(2)schedules, or (3) loads, the process has provided the faculty with 
the opportunity to make policy decisions for the two important issues of 
(1) dismissal for cause, and (2) grievance procedures. For the Oregon 
academicians, this is an important result of the bargaining process, as 
Barbara Lee in 1979 concluded from her study: "The single most 
significant effort of unionization was the promulgation of a formai 
grievance procedure" (Lee, 1979). 
Reconunendations 
Suggested Further Research 
Since the 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education report was 
published, educational analysts have researched the multidimensional 
complexities of academic collective bargaining. From these studies, 
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scholars have confirmed the causes, effects, as well as the major trends 
of the process, as adopted by the university system (Lee, 1979; 
Baldridge, 1982). 
This investigator, like other educational scholars, is convinced 
that additional research must be conducted in order to empirically test 
those collective bargaining issues in academia that are still only 
reasonable hypotheses (Spinard, 1984). Therefore, the following 
academic bargaining issues specific to (1) the Oregon system of higher 
education; and (2) an expanded academic population are suggested for 
future research. 
Oregon System of Higher Education 
Within the 4-year institutions· of Oregonls higher educational 
system, the following research appears to be warranted. 
First, research could h.e conducted to evaluate the perception of 
those fauclty members employed in the three subject institutions who 
(1) have taught less than five years in a university system, (2) lack 
tenure, and/or (3) hold a lower academic rank. The perceptions of this 
faculty population about institutional governance might show a 
considerable difference from that of the respondents of this study. As 
the early research of Ladd and Lipset found: 
Faculty employed in the lower tier of academia in terms of 
scholarly benefits, financial resources, and economic benefits 
-- and those who are in the lower ranks, lack tenure, and who 
are younger are much more likely to favor organized collective 
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action (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). 
Second, the aggregate data of the study showed the greater number 
of respondents in the three subject institutions elect nonparticipation 
in the institutional bargaining process. However, this study found 
statistically significant differences between the degree of the 
respondents' involvement in the process and their perceptions of 
academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode. 
Therefore, a question for further research could be, "If academic 
collective bargaining has been selected by the faculty members as a 
supplemental governance mode for the institution, why do they not elect 
to be an active participant in the process?" 
Third, a major trend of academic collective bargaining has been to 
serve the economic concerns of the faculty. In addition, it should 
provide for faculty involvement in budgeting decisions, which are 
critical to assure the establishment of academic goals consistent with 
academic values (Mason, 1982). A study could be conducted that would 
compare those faculty members employed in Oregon's three unionized 
institutions with the faculty of the five non-unionized 4-year 
institutions on economic issues. More precisely, this study would focus 
on those issues specific to (1) salary and (2) budgetary planning of the 
institutions. 
Fourth, this research study suggests that the Southern Oregon State 
College respondents appear to have a positive attitude toward academic 
collective bargaining as a facilitator of their rights to participate in 
the governance process. Southern Oregon State College respondents, 
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unlike those at Western Oregon State College and Portland State 
University, are represented by an independent bargaining agent. 
Therefore, a research study could be designed to study the question, "Do 
respondents' attitudes toward their bargaining agent influence their 
perceptions of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental 
governance mode?" 
Fifth, and of particular interest to the investigator, would be a 
study to identify those contextual factors, as well as the academic 
governance structures and relations, which influenced the faculty 
members at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University, in 1977 
and 1983 respectively, to defeat a union coalition. 
An Expanded Population 
The investigator has extensively reviewed the literature in order 
to identify the scope of research that has been conducted on academic 
collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode. This study, 
like many reviewed, limits the survey to a specific geographical 
population. Therefore, it is recommended that this study be replicated 
using a larger number of 4-year institutions of higher education, in 
order to have more generalized data about faculty members' perceptions 
of academic collective bargaining to answer the research questions of 
the study: Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental 
governance mode supported faculty members' rights for participation in 
institutional governance? 
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Closing Sunnnary 
This chapter has provided a sunnnary of the study, a discussion of 
the conclusions suggested from the findings of the study ,specific to 
the three major areas of the research study: (1) respondent information, 
(2) institutional influences, and (3) institutional governance 
information. In addition, recommendations were made for further 
research to answer the question, Has academic collective bargaining, as 
a supplemental governance mode, supported faculty members' rights for 
partic.ipation in institutional governance? 
To sum up, this investigator concurs with the statement of Ernest 
Benjamin, the new American Association of University Professors General 
Secretary, that: 
Bargaining is not a substitute for governance. Rather, 
collective bargaining provides a foundation for the defense of 
governance as the tightened academic market both lessens the 
bargaining power of individual faculty and increases the 
pressure on administration to subordinate academic and 
external priorities. Faculty will continue to pursue --
through agreement, litigation, or legislation -- the right to 
bargain (Benjamin, 1984). 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
Respondent Information 
A Questionnaire to Study 
Collec tive Bargaining As 
A Process Adopted In Oregon s 
Four-Year Institutions Of Higher 
Education to Support Faculty Members 
Participation in Institutional Governance 
A. ~ Questionnaire 
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Please read each statement carefully Check the answer(s) for each item as it be.t applies 
to you as a full-time faculty member in your univer.ity system during the 1983-1984 academic 
year 
I How many years have you taught full time in a four-year institution of higher education? 
2 
a 1-4 years 
b. 5-10 years 
c· 11-15 years 
d 16-20 years 
e. 21-25 years 
f Over 25 years 
Are you a member of AAUP? . 
a. Yes 
b No 
For the 1983-84 academic year indicate the range below for your 9 months salary 
a 
b 
c 
d 
S10 000-$15 000 
$16 000-S20 000 
$21 000-S25 000 
$26 000-$30 000 
e. $31 000-$35 000 
f $36 000-$40 000 
g Over $40 000 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
4 During the 1983-1984 academic year are you serving as a member of one or more of the 
university/departmental academic governing bodies listed below? 
a 
b 
c 
d 
Faculty Academic Senate 
Finance Committee 
Rank and Tenure Committee 
Other policy-making Committee 
5. What is your age range? 
a 20-29 
b. 30-39 
c. 40-49 
d. 50-59 
e· 60 or above 
Spec ify 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
O. How involved have you been with the collective bargaining process in your institution? 
a Slightly active 
b Active 
c· '/eryactive 
d ~o involvement 
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II Institutional rnfluence~ 
Listed below are factors that might influence a faculty member to select collective bar-
gaining Please read each statement carefully Decide whether you strongly agree agree are 
undecided. disagree or strongly disagree that the factor raised below influenced you as a fac-
ulty member to vote for the renewal of the collective bargaining contract for your institution 
in June of 1983 
The institution was experiencing a decline 
in student enrollment 
8. State legislature funding was reduced for 
your institution. 
9 Federal funds appropriated for research have 
been reduced. 
10 The structural size of the institution had 
grown rapidly during the preceding five years 
11 Limited institutional funds have decreased the 
development of academic programs. 
12 The central administration had experienced a 
reduced autonomy in policy-making deCisions 
for the institution. 
13 The educational policy decision-making rights 
of the institution s central administration 
were controlled by the state educational agency 
14 The faculty academic senate/council has become 
less effective as a governance body 
15 There was a decline in the faculty members 
influence on policy decision-making at the 
departmental level 
16. There was a reduced sense of collegiality 
among the facul ty 
17 Student power has increased on the campus 
18. The institution has developed and implemented 
a new mission and goal statements 
19 The institution has designed and implemented 
a new organizational structure. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Unde-
Agree cided 
Ois- Strongly 
agree Disolgree 
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tIl Institutional Governance Information 
A Professional tnterests 
Please read each statement carefully Decide whether you strongly agree agree are unde-
cided disagree or .trongly disagree that academic collective bargaining has provided you with' 
20 An academic milieu supportive of the intel-
lectual pursuit of .cholarship 
21 A collegial relationship with administration 
22 A formalized structure and proce.s for insti-
tutional decision-making 
23 A professional rather than employee status to 
their role in the institution 
24 An increased interest in the function and role 
of the faculty senate/council 
25 An influence in .etting institutional standards 
for academic performance 
26 Invol vement in the .el ec t ion process for the 
appointment of an administrator to a centrai or 
departmental administrative position. 
27 The right to participation in policy making on 
educational issues that have the potential to 
affect public opinion about the institution 
Strongly 
Agree 
Unde- Dis-
Agree cided agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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a Economic Interests 
Please read each 9tatement carefully Decide if you strongly agree agree are undecided 
disagree or 9trongly disagree that in your instltution the collective bargaining process has· 
28 Provided you with a high public profile re-
garding budgetary issues in Oregon·s system 
of higher education. 
29 Clarified the problem of a low faculty salary 
9chedule in Oregon 9 system of higher education 
30 Increased the importance of the budgetaryl 
financial affairs committee s role in university 
budget analysis and planning 
31 Strengthened your input into short-range uni-
versity budget planning and decision-making 
32 Provided for your input into the long-range 
budgetary pLanning model of the university 
33 Encouraged the university budgetary affairs 
committee to link university budget planning 
to the identified institution s academic goals 
34 Assisted the faculty and administration to 
present a united agreement to the state legis-
lature 
35 Generated additional money for the university 
faculty salary schedule in Oregon s system of 
higher education 
36 Increased your salary and fringe benefits 
package in the university system 
Strongly Unde-
Agree Agree cided 
[ . 1 
Dis- Strongly 
agree 0 isagree 
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C Educa~ional Policies 
Please decide if you .~rongly agree agree are undecided disagree or s~rongly d1sagree 
tha~ collective bargaining has provided you with an opporcunity to determine educational poli-
cies rela~ed to the following academic issues: 
37 Admission Standards 
38 Curriculum Content 
39 Degree Requirements 
40 Grading Standards 
41 Standards for Student Conduct and Discipline 
42 Types of Degrees Offered 
43 Establishment of Educational Programs 
o Academic and Personnel Policies 
Strongly Unde-
Agree Agree cided 
Dis- Strongly 
agree Disagree 
Listed below are academic and personnel policies which AAUP believes faculty members should 
govern Please decide if collective bargaining has provided the faculty members employed in your 
institution with the opportunity to always frequently infrequently or never parcicipate in de-
termining policies related to the follOWing issues' 
AcademiC Duties 
Always Frequently Infrequently Never 
44. Teaching Assignmenc 
45. Teaching Schedule 
46 Teaching Loads 
2 Academic Standards/Personnel Policies for 
47· Facul ty Recrui tment 
48. Faculty Promotion 
49 F acul ty Tenu~e 
50 Academic Freedom 
51 Dismissal for Cause (Just Cause) 
52 Salary Scale 
53 Fringe Benefits 
54. Grievance Procedures 
Support Services 
55 Office Space 
56. Secretarial Help 
Thank you 'Iery :nuch for parC1cipating in this research study 
of the scudy? 
Yes No 
Would you like to receive an abstracc 
APPENDIX B 
FINDINGS SPECIFIC TO THE 1969 CARNEGIE COMMISSION 
ON HIGHER EDUCATION SURVEY 
FACULTY ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND UNIONISM, 
BY PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REI-lARDS; AS 
PERCENTAGES OF n (LAnD AND LIPSET, 1973)· 
The 1969 Survey 
All faculty (60.028 respondents) 
Quality of school at which professor teaches" 
A (elite) (n = 19.089) 
B (n = 25.224) 
C (n = 13.110) 
D (lowest tier) (n = 2,580) 
Type of institu rion 
university (n = 44,871) 
four-year college (n = 13.020) 
two-year college (n = 2,133) 
Tenure 
tenured faculty (n = 29,853) 
untenured faculty (n = 26,766) 
Received research grants. last 12 months 
yes [received grant(s)! (n = 27.966) 
no (n = 29.778) 
Salary 
over 520,000 (n = 6,420) 
514.000 - S20.000 (n = 15,567) 
SI0.000- 514,000 (n = 21,-117) 
under 510.000 (n = 15.312) 
Age 
60 years and older (n = 4.398) 
50-59 (n "9.408) 
40-49 (n = 16,113) 
30-39 (n " 20.580) 
under 30 (n = 8.607) 
Disagree. 
no place on campus 
for faculty collective 
bargaining 
59 
53 
55 
60 
67 
54 
61 
67 
54 
64 
54 
61 
45 
52 
59 
66 
45 
53 
57 
62 
68 
Agree, 
faculty strikes can 
be legitimate 
acrion 
47 
49 
44 
44 
52 
46 
46 
49 
41 
53 
49 
47 
38 
42 
47 
51 
30 
35 
44 
52 
60 
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APPENDIX C 
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REVIEW 
COMMITTEE APPROVAL LETTER 
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCP. REVIEW Cot!MlTIEE 
1982-83 
TO: Patricia Chadwick - ED 
FROM: Robert Holloway, Chairperson 
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In accordance with your request, the Human Subjects Research Review Committee 
has reviewed your proposal entitled, "Collective Bargaining: A ~rpcess Adopted 
by Oregon's Four-Year Institutions of Higher Education ... " 
for compliance with DREW policies and regulations on the protection of human 
subjects. 
The committee {s satisfied that your provisions for protecting the rights 
and welfare of all subjects participating in the research are adequate and 
therefore the project is approved. Any conditions relative to this approval 
are noted below. 
Conditions: NONE 
cc: Office of Graduate Studies and Research 
APPENDIX D 
DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION LETTER FROM THE OFFICE 
OF INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE AT 
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
PORTLAND 
STATE 
UNiVERSITY 
:l 0 ~ox 751 
porllana. oregon 
97207 
office of 
Instllutlonal 
'esearch 
503,229· 3432 
Pat Chadwick, Dean 
School of Nursing 
University of Portland 
5000 N. Willamette Blvd. 
Portland, Oregon 97203 
Dear Dean Chadwick: 
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May 17, 1984 
Attached are the lists of faculty from Portland State University, Southern 
Oregon State College, and Western Oregon State College, which you requested 
for use in gathering data for your doctoral dissertation. The criteria 
which were used in selecting faculty for the lists are as follows: 
• Hire date (Personnel Data Base element #27) prior to 12/31/78 
• Holds an academic appointment for FY 83-84 at a total FTE .50 
or greater (PDB element #44) 
• Is on an annual tenure (tenure-track) or indefinite tenure 
appointment (POB element #56) 
The data base used for selection was extracted from the November 8, 1983 
payroll tapes for the subject institutions and is the same data base which 
was provided to those institutions for purposes of EEO-6 reporting for 
Fall 1983. 
Please call me if I can be of further assistance. 
MFR:gh 
Enclosures 
Sincerely, 
~~~,+<~ 
Mary F. Ri cks 
Research Assistant 
xc: James H. Beaird, Provost 
Western Oregon State College 
Ernest E. Ettlich, Dean of Acad. Affairs 
Southern Oregon State College 
Don E. Gardner, Director 
Office of Institutional Research 
Portland State University 
APPENDIX E 
INSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL LETTERS FOR DATA COLLECTION 
~ wosc 
Office or the Provost 
Mr. Don Gardner 
Director 
May 11, 1984 
Office of Institutional Research 
Portland state University 
P.o. ;Sox 751 
Portland, OR 97207 
Dear Mr. Gardner: 
This will authorize you' to select a sample of 
WOSC faculty from institutional tapes for use by 
I. 
Ms. Pat Chadwick in her doctoral dissertation regarding 
collective bargaining. 
JHB/tn 
Western Oregon State College 
Monmouth. Oregon 97361 
(503) 838-1 220 Ext. 271 
sl1erelY, 
1/ .f' '\DL .... J~ ~_ ~-=--~ 
, James H. Beaird 
""Provost 
", 
RECE/V,..O 
c 8v 
, arFJe 
SOUTHERN OREGON 
STATE COLLEGE 
155 E OF 
ASHLAND. OREGON 97520 
:1ay 10, 1984 
Mr. Don Gardner 
Director of Institutional Research 
Portland State University 
302 University Services Building 
Fortland OR 97207 
Dear :1r. Gardner: 
M" 
·Ii Y . 
Professor Walt Ellis called on :1ay 9 asking permission for a random 
structured sample of our faculty to be drawn for a study being conducted 
in education. Pat Chadwick will be doing a dissertation under Professor 
Ellis which deals with faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining. 
This letter is to grant permission for such a structured sample to be 
taken w~ile protecting the confidential elements within the personnel 
files and tapes. 
I would appreciate recelvlng a copy of the results of the study when Ms. 
Chadwick has completed it. 
;Z;/~ 
Ernest E. Ettlich 
Dean of Academic Affairs 
pkj 
':i. i9S4 
APPENDIX F 
APPEAL LETTER TO SUBJECTS FOR WAVE 
ONE OF THE DATA COLLECTION 
PORTL."".ND 
STATE 
UNIVERSITY 
May 18,1984 
157 
PO. BOX 751 
PORTLAND, OREGON 
97207 
I am writing to request your participation in my doctoral dissertation research. 
The study has been approved by the University Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee and by my dissertation committee chaired by Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Professor 
of Public Administration. 
The purpose of the research study is to evaluate whether or not the adoption 
of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's 
four-year institutions of higher education has provided support for faculty m~~bers 
to participate in institutional governance. Selected faculty members with academic 
appointments at Portland State University, Southern Oregon State College, and 
Hestern Oregon State College are being asked to participate in the study. 
Please take 15 minutes to complete and return the enclosed questionnaire by 
~y 31, 1984, in the stamped, self-addressed envelope. All the information which 
you provide in response to the questionnaire, will be kept confidential and anony-
mous. The numbers on the upper right-hand corner of the questionnaire represent a 
code, which will be used only to enable a follow-up on unreturned questionnaires. 
I realize that this is a very busy time in the academic year; however, your 
response will assist in my research and hopefully add to the evaluation of collec-
tive bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the Oregon university system 
of higher education. 
If you have any questions or concerns about the questionnaire or the study, 
please call me at 283-7211. Thank you in advance for your time and assistance with 
this doctoral research study. 
PLC:bcD Enclosure 
Sincerely, 
'S?'~.-<w .,;r'" cZ7 .... k/(.b 
Patricia L. Chadwick 
Doctoral Candidate 
School of Education 
2~~~ 
Professor of Public Administration 
Dissertation Committee Chairperson 
APPENDIX G 
FOLLOW-UP APPEAL MATERIAL TO SUBJECTS FOR WAVES 
TWO AND THREE OF THE DATA COLLECTION 
May 28, 1984 
Dear Professor: 
This past week , I wrote to request your participation in 
my doctoral dissertation research. The study is designed 
to evaluate collective bargaining as a supplemental 
governance mode in the Oregon university system of higher 
education. 
As you plan your week of May 28, 1984, will you please 
allow 15 minutes in your schedule to complete the question-
naire for the study? Thank you. G;~ ~~/~ 
Patricia L. Chadwick 
Doctoral Candidate 
School of Education 
Portland State University 
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PORTLAND 
STATE 
U,'iIVERSITY 
Dear 
June 4, 1984 
160 
PO. BOX 751 
PORTLAND. OREGON 
97207 
Two weeks ago, I wrote to request your participation in my doctoral disser-
tation research. The study has been designed to evaluate whether or not the 
adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of 
Oregon's four-year institutions of higher education has provided support for 
faculty members to participate in institutional governance. 
To date, I have not received your completed questionnaire; therefore, I would 
like to once again appeal for your participation in my study. 
For your convenience, I am sending a new copy of the questionnaire, as well 
as a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The questionnaire will take approximately 
15 minutes of your time to complete. All the information which you provide in 
response to the questionnaire, will be kept confidential and anonymous. 
If you have any questions about the study, please call me at 283-7211 or 
my dissertation co~.ttee chairperson, Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Professor of Public 
Administration at 229-3920. 
Thank you for considering my request to participate in this doctoral research 
study. 
PLC:bcb 
Enclosures 
Sincerely, 
~~..;..l! ~,~ 
Patricia L. Chadwick 
Doctoral Candidate 
School of Education 
Portland State University 
APPENDIX H 
RESPONDENT CODE BOOK FOR THE (SPSSX) DATA ANALYSIS 
CARD 
Respondent Codebook - Collective Bargaining As A ?rocess Adopted 
in Oregon'~-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Support 
Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance 
COLUMNS QUESTION 
A 
2-4 B 
5 C 
D 
7-8 E 
9-10 
11-12 
13 F 
14 G 
15 1 
16 2 
17 3 
VARIABLE 
Respondent ID # 
Institution 
School/Department 
of AppoLntment 
Date of Response 
Response Received 
With: 
Academic Rank 
Full-Time Teaching 
MUP Membership 
1983-1984 Academic 
Year 9 mo. Salary 
CODE 
Put Number 
1. •• WOSC 
2 ••• SOSC 
3 ••• PSU 
1 ••• Liberal Arts Department/College 
2 ••• College of Liberal Arts ~ Sciences 
3 ••• Professional School 
4 ••• Others 
Year - 84 
9 - No Response 
Month - 05 May 
06 June 
07 July 
08 August 
9 - No Response 
Date - 01-31 
9 - No Response 
1 ••• First Wave 
2 ... Second Wave 
3 ••• Third Wave 
4 - No Response 
1 ••• Professor 
2 ••• Associate ?rofesaor 
3 ••• Aasistant Professor 
4 ••• Ins truc tor 
5 ••• No Rank 
1 ••• 1-4 years 
2 ... 5-10 years 
3 ... 11-15 years 
4 ... 16-20 years 
5 ... 21-25 years 
6 ••• Over 25 years 
9 ••• No Response 
1 ... Yes 
2 ••• No 
9 ••• No Response 
1 ••• 10,000-15,000 
2 ••• 16,000.20,000 
3 ••• 21,000-25,000 
4 ••• 26,000-30,000 
5 ••• 31,000-35,000 
6 ••• 36,000-40,000 
7 ... Over 4{), 000 
9 ••• No Response 
162 
CARD COLUMNS QUESTION VARIABLE CODE 
18 4 
19 5 
20 6 
21 7 
22 8 
23 9 
24 10 
25 11 
26 12 
27 13 
28 14 
29 15 
30 16 
31 17 
32 18 
1983-1984 Academic 
Age Range 
Involvement With 
Collective Bargaining 
Decline In Student 
Enrollmenc 
Reduced State Funding 
1 ••• Faculcy Academic Senate 
2 ••• Finance 
3 ••• Rank a Tenure 
4 ••• Others 
9 ••• No Response 
1. •. 20-29 
2 ••• 30-39 
3 ••• 40-49 
4 ••• 50-59 
5 ••• 60 or above 
9 ••• No Response 
1. .. Sl1ghcly AcUve 
2 ••• AcCive 
3 ••• Very Ac cive 
4 ••• No involvemenc 
9 ••• No Responlle 
1 ••• Strongly Agree 
2 ••• Agree 
3 ••• Undecided 
4 ••• Disagree 
5 ••• Strongly Disagree 
9 ••• No Response 
Code same as 7 
Reduced Federal Code same as 7 
Research Funding 
Rapid Five-Year Code same aa 7 
Inll ti tu tional Growth 
Decrealled Development Code IIame all 7 
of Academic Programll 
Due to Funding 
Reduced Central Admin- Code same as 7 
istration'II Autonomy 
in Policy-Making 
Increalled Control of Code same as 7 
Educational Policy-
Making by State Edu-
cation Agency 
Academic Senate/Council Code same aa 7 
Governance Effective-
nesa 
Reduced Faculty Members' Code same as 7 
Influence on Depart-
mental Level Policy-
Making 
Reduced Faculty Colle- Code same all 7 
gedity 
Increased Student Power Code same all 7 
New Inscructional ~111- Code same all 
Ilion and Goal State-
lIlents 
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CARD COLUMNS QUESTION VARtABLE CODE 
33 19 
34 20 
35 21 
36 22 
37 23 
38 24 
39 25 
40 26 
41 27 
42 28 
43 29 
44 30 
45 31 
46 32 
47 33 
48 34 
New Instructional Or-
ganizational Struc-
ture 
Code same as 7 
Academic Milieu Support- Code .ame as 7 
ive of Scholarship 
Collegial Relationship Code lame as 7 
with Administration 
Formal Decision-Making Code same as 7 
Structure/Process 
Professional Status Code same as 7 
Role 
Increased Interest in Code same as 7 
the Faculty Senate/ 
Council 
Influence in Setting Code same as 7 
Standards for Academic 
Performance 
Involvement in the Ad-
ministrative Position 
Selection Process 
Participation in Educa-
tional Policy Issues 
High Public Profile Re-
garding Budgetary 
Issues 
Clarification of Lev 
Facul ty Salary 
Schedule 
Code same as 7 
Code same as 7 
Code same as 7 
1 ••• Strongly Agree 
2 ••• Agree 
3 ••• Undecided 
4 ••• Disagree 
5 ••• Strongly Disagree 
9 ••• No Response 
Importance of a Code ,ame as 29 
Budgetary/Financial 
Committee in univer-
sity Analysia/Planning 
Input into Short-Range Code same as 29 
Budgetary Planning 
Input into the Long Code same as 29 
Range Budgetary 
Planning Model 
Linkage of University Code same as 29 
Budgetary Planning to 
Academic Goals 
United Faculty & Admin- Code same as 29 
istration Budgetary 
Agreement to State 
Legislature 
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CARD COLUMNS QUESTION VARIABLE CODE 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Draft #4 
9/26/84 
70 
71 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Increased Funding for 
the Fsculty Salary 
Schedule 
Code same as 29 
Increased Faculty Salary Code same as 29 
and Fringe Benefit 
Packages 
Admission Standards 
Curriculum Content 
Degree Requirements 
Grading Standards 
Standards for Student 
Conduct/Discipline 
Code same as 29 
Code same as 29 
Code same as 29 
Code same as 29 
Code same as 29 
Types of Degrees Offered Code same as 29 
Establishment of Edu-
cational Program 
Teaching Aaa1gnment 
Teaching Schedule 
Teaching Load 
Faculty Recruitment 
Faculty Promotion 
F acul ty Tenure 
Academic Freedom 
Dismissal for Just 
Cause 
Salary Scale 
Fringe Benefi ts 
Grievance Procedures 
Office Space 
Secretarial Help 
Abstract Request 
Code same as 29 
L ••• Alvays 
2 ••• Frequently 
3 ••• Infrequently 
4 ••. Never 
9 ••• No Response 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
Code same as 44 
1. •. Yee 
2 ••• No 
9 ••• No Response 
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APPENDIX I 
TABLE XXIV: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INFLUENCES RELATED TO THE DECISION-MAKING TO 
VOTE FOR A 1983 CONTRACT RENEWAL 
TABLE XXIV 
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INFLUENCES RELATED TO THEIR DECISION-MAKING 
TO VOTE FOR A 1983 CONTRACT RENEWAL 
Institutional [nfluences 
Statements 
7. The institution was 
experiencing a de-
cline in student en-
rollment. 
Strongly 
Agree 
N ("I.) 
26 (6.27,) 
B. State legislative 157 (37.1%) 
funding was reduced 
for your institution. 
9. Federal funding appro- 32 (7.6"1.) 
priated for research 
have been reduced. 
10. The .tructural size of 16 (3.9'/,) 
the instltution had 
gro"," rapidly during 
the preceding fiscal 
year. 
11. Li.mited institutional 125 (29.67,) 
funds have decreased 
the development of 
academic programs. 
12. The een tra 1 admlnis- 35 (B.47,) 
tration had experi-
enced a reduced au-
tonomy in pol icy-
",aking dec i5ions 
for the institution. 
13. The educational pol- 48 ( 11.57.) 
lcy decision-making 
rtghts of the in 5 t i-
tution's central ad-
minis~ration were 
con tro lied by the 
5ta te educational 
agency. 
14. The facul ty academic 59 ( 14.0%) 
senate/council has 
become les s effective 
as a governance body. 
15. There was a dec 1 ine 71 (16.97,) 
in the facul ty mem-
bers' inf luence on 
pollcy-maktng deci-
Sions at the depart-
men tal level. 
16. There was • reduced 72 ( 17.1'/.) 
sense of collegial-
ity among the faculty. 
17. Stuaent power has in- (0.57.) 
creased on the campus. 
Frequency 
Agree Undecided 
N (7,) N ('/,) 
109 (26.0)'/, 66 (15. S'/,) 
168 (39.2'/,) 30 (7.1'/,) 
88 (21.0'/,) III (26,5'/,) 
62 (15.1%) 81 (19. 7'/,) 
177 (41.87,) 47 (11. 1%) 
93 ( 22.5"1.) 107 (25.77.) 
124 (29.67.) 98 (23.4"1.) 
149 (35.:''1.) 76 (18.1'/.) 
127 (30.n) 41 (9.7%) 
IL.8 (35.1'/,) 61 ( 14.5'1.) 
43 ( 10. 2~~) 70 (16.67.) 
Disagree 
!! ("I.) 
132 (31.5'/,) 
40 (9.5"1.) 
114 (27.27,) 
152 (36.9'!,) 
48 ( Il.~:\) 
118 (28.3'/,) 
107 (25.57.) 
102 (24 .2~',) 
128 (30.4~~) 
99 ( 23. 5~'.) 
198 (:.7.01.) 
167 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N ('/,) 
86 (20.S',,) 
2B (6.6~·,) 
74 (17. 7~',) 
101 (2~.5~·.1 
26 (6. 2~;) 
64 ( 15.4'/,) 
42 ( 10.0~·,) 
35 (8. J~.) 
54 ( 12.S·.) 
42 \ lO.J-.) 
lOB (25. ;%) 
168 
Tab Ie XXIV (continued) 
frequency 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Disagree 
In9titutional lnf luences N (",) N (~, ) !!. ("I.) N ("I.) !!. ("I.) 
Statements 
18. The institutlon has 12 ( 2.9"1.) 96 (22.9"1.) 1I2 (26. no) 135 (32.2"/.) 61 ( 15.37,) 
developed and imp le-
men ted a new ml5sion 
and goal statement. 
19. The instLtution has 25 ( 6.0'/,) 125 (29.9',,) 102 (24.4"1.) 111 (26.6'/,) 55 ( l3 .27,) 
designed and imp le-
mented a new organi-
zational strue ture. 
APPENDIX J 
TABLE XXX: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF 
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THEIR PROFESSIONAL 
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 
, 
IAIII.E XXX 
FACUI.TY MEHnER!)' PERCEI'TIUNS of ACAm:tHC CULl.ECII Vi':: 
lll~il ltul itlllal (;OVt.:'rnall~c 
Pn)icSSlollal inlerest!> 
:.W. Au ul.'ddcmic mi I lell Huppur Livt! 
of lilt' inlellecLu ... " pursuil 
of scholarship. 
21. A collegial rclaliolls1lip 
Willi aliminiHI..-alion. 
22. A formalized structure and 
pruCeSS (or illstilutiollal 
dccl~ion-making. 
23. A profe~s1onal. rathe. than 
employee, status to lllei..-
role In the instiLution. 
24. All incrcd9cd IJllerc~l in the 
functiun and role or the fac-
ulty senate/coullc!l. 
25. An Influence in selling instl-
[ullOndl stiJndards (oJ"" academic 
Jlerformance. 
:lb. Involvement in the selection 
prUCCti5 for Illc apl10inlment of 
an aJminislraLt)r to a c~nLral 
or dCI,artmenlul administrative 
p061lioll. 
27. Ttl~ r1stlt Lo parliclpation in 
pulicy making on ~ducatlonal i~­
SUt·~ tliat hdve the potential to 
affect fJuvl1c opinion avout th~ 
institution. 
IIAH(;AININ(;'S IHI'A.:r ON TllclH PHIlFcSSIUNAI. 
INTEHESTS IN INSllTlJTlUNAL GUVERNANCE 
frequency 
Strongly lIndc- 01s-
Agree Agree c idcd agree 
!! (7.) !:l. (7.) N (7.) !:l. (7.) 
12 (2.~7.) HI (18.37.) 8~ (11.Y7.) 184 (38. n.) 
II (2.37.) 8U (lb. 77..) 61 (14.07.) 2U2 (42.37.) 
52 (I I.U7.) 174 Ob. 7"1.) 78 (lb.~7.) 119 (25.17.) 
19 (4.17.) 9J (20.0'L) 85 (18.37.) 145 (31.2"f.) 
14 (2.97.) 104 (21.97.) HI (I7.U7.) IHI 08.07.) 
IH (3.8·,,) III (24.S·L) 87 (18.27.) 162 (34.07,) 
21 (4.47.) 95 (lO.O·L) 81 (17.17.) 176 (37. I·'.) 
28 (5.97.) 122 (2~.67,) 90 (l1I.n) 153 02.17.) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (7.) 
lUI (22.~7.) 
III! (24. n.) 
~ I (10.87,) 
123 (26.57.) 
Yb (20.27.) 
93 (19.57.) 
101 (21.37.) 
84 (17.67.) 
Total 
Re~pondentH 
41~ 
418 
474 
465 
47b 
477 
474 
477 
.... 
-...J 
o 
APPENDIX K 
TABLE XXXII: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT 
OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 
TAtlI.c XXXII 
FAClIl.TY MHllIlHS' 1'~:HCI:I'll(JN$ Of' ACADEMIC COl-
!.El:TlH lIAH(:AINING'S IMPACT ON ECONOMIC 
INTEH£STS IN INS'flTUTIUNAL GOV£HNANCI: 
Int>tilullollal (;ovcrllancc 
£conocuic Interests 
2tL P.-ovlded yuu with II high pullitc 
profile regarding budgetary l~­
sues i.l Orcgoll's 5y~lcrn of hlgl,-
er cduccJ.lion. 
29. Clard led the problem of a low 
faculty salary fjchcdulc in Ore-
gon's system of higher education. 
30. Increased the imporlance of the 
budgetary/financIal affairs com-
mittee'u rolc in university bud-
gcl analysis and planning. 
31. Strengthl!ncd your input into 
6horl-rungt!' universIty budget 
planning and decision-making. 
32. Provided for your input into 
tllt! long-range budgetary plan-
ning model of the university. 
33. Encouraged the university bud-
getary affairs cOIIInittce to link 
univeraily budget planning LO the 
identified insl1tution's academic 
goals. 
34. Assisted the faculty and adminis-
tratloll to prc~cnL d llnit~d dgrt!t!-
mcnt to ltle state le8i~laturc. 
Slrongly 
Agrct~ 
N (7.) 
AHrcc 
N (1.) 
Frequellcy 
Unde-
clded 
N (7.) 
Dis-
agree 
N (7.) 
19 (4.01.) 107 (22.77.) III (11.2"1.) 193 (41.01.) 
46 (9.77.) 169 U5.11.) 59 (12.57.) Il5 (211.51.) 
16 U.47.) 150 01.117.) 131 (29.01.) 129 (21.31.) 
15 (l.27.) 116 (24.61.) 116 (111.2"1.) 1113 011.11/.) 
12 (2.61.) 100 (21.2/.) 116 (24.67.) 164 (J4.61.) 
Il (2.111.) 94 (20.17.) 1511 (JJ.II1.) 140 (29.91.) 
23 (4.111.) Il6 (20.11.) 119 (25.17.) 126 (27.07.) 
Strongl y 
Uisdgrt:c 
N (7.) 
11 (15.11.) 
65 (13.17.) 
40 (8.57.) 
12 (15.37.) 
79 (16.67.) 
63 (Il. 57.) 
67 (14.17.) 
35. Gencrat(!o additional money for the 
university faculty salary schedule 
in Oregon's syutem of higher educa-
tion. 
II (1.77.) b4 (13.51.) 7J «5.47.) IYl (40.67.) 136 (2!l.II%) 
36. increased your salary and fringe 
benefit!>: packLlgt.· in the univer-
sity system. 
III (l.1I7.) 110 (2J.l7.) 7J (15.47.) 14b DO.1I7.) 127 (2b.81.) 
Tol.,1 
Respondents 
47b 
414 
472 
412 
411 
4bll 
475 
473 
474 
..... 
-..J 
N 
